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Occupational deviance in the form of cellphone contraband introduction poses a 
serious threat to the safe and secure operations of correctional facilities across the United 
States.  More importantly, security staff members who participate in this form of 
unethical and illegal behavior undermine and impair both staff-inmate relationships as 
well as collegial relationships among officers.  The purpose of this study was to explore 
the perspectives of correctional officers who have experienced contraband introduction 
by fellow correctional officers and to understand the overall impact within the 
correctional environment.  Based on ethical climate theory, this qualitative 
phenomenological study sought to describe the contributions of social factors as well as 
organizational policy practices regarding cellphone contraband introduction by 
correctional officers.  Through phenomenological data analysis, findings indicated that 
correctional officers were more likely to ascribe universal responsibility to both the 
organization and officer violators and to believe that contradictions within the 
organizational climate inadvertently reinforced cellphone contraband introduction among 
fellow officers.  Recommendations included alternative interview options, expanding the 
geographical search area for sampling, exploring factors within the organization that 
could impact the organizational climate, and comparing climate-related acts of deviance 
in other correctional settings.  The data provided in this study adds additional insight for 
correctional administrators into the necessity of a multifaceted approach to addressing 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
An organization’s ability to function is reliant on the quality of the individuals 
within it, which is especially true within the field of corrections.  Within the last 20 years, 
corrections officials have noticed an unsettling surge in occupational deviance especially 
as it relates to cellphone contraband introduction (Burke & Owen, 2010; Roth, 2011).  
Cellphone contraband is not a localized issue that only affects select areas but has been 
identified as a global problem (Burke & Owen, 2010).  Cellphones within prisons 
threaten the safety, security, and stability of the correctional environment and pose a 
significant risk of danger to both inmates as well as staff members within the facility 
(Grommon, Carter, & Scheer, 2018; Kalinich & Stojkovic, 1985) because these devices 
allow for the continuation of criminal activity as well as unmonitored access to society 
(Burke & Owen, 2010).  Cellphones in prisons have been linked to activities such as 
extortion, escape attempts, drug trafficking, gang activity, and even murder plots (Burke 
& Owen, 2010; Kalinich & Stojkovic, 1985; Roth, 2011).  For example, a 2008 case in 
Texas highlighted the dangers of cellphone contraband in prisons when an inmate 
contacted a well-known state senator from a contraband cellphone and threatened the 
safety of his adult daughters (Graczyk, 2008).  Similarly, a recent South Carolina case 
brought the indictments of 34 individuals from Georgia, North Carolina, and South 
Carolina who were all accused of aiding in a large-scale drug trafficking case by inmates 
orchestrating distribution with the help of contraband phones (Waters, 2017).  In Florida, 
several employees were arrested for attempted contraband introduction after it was 
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discovered the employees were illegally communicating with an inmate serving a life 
sentence (Wear, 2018).  This inmate was also involved in sexual relationships with at 
least two of the officers arrested and was attempting to exploit the sexual relationships to 
force their assistance with methamphetamine distribution within the facility (Wear, 
2018).  And although these may seem like isolated cases, they are more common than not 
within American corrections regardless of size. 
Besides California, nine southern states—South Carolina, Oklahoma, Georgia, 
Alabama, Tennessee, Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana, and Arkansas—had the highest 
cellphone confiscation rates within their prisons than any of other states in the nation 
(Riley, 2017).  Corrections officials in one of these southern states appear to understand 
the importance of eliminating the issue of cellphone contraband (Cook, 2015; Rankin, 
2015; Riley, 2017).  This particular state is identified as having the fourth largest 
corrections department in the nation and ranked within the top 10 departments with the 
highest rates of cellphone contraband.  Further, cellphone contraband confiscation rates 
in this particular state were the third-highest in the nation (Riley, 2017) compared to 
states with the three largest departments of corrections—Texas, California, and Florida 
which are the largest, second-largest, and third-largest, respectively—in the United States 
(“Cell Extortion,” 2015).  Corrections officials are aggressively targeting cellphone 
contraband introduction within their facilities in attempts to curb the problem in many 
states around the country. For instance, corrections officials in one state reported a 
15.02% reduction in contraband from 16,322 incidents in 2016 to 13,870 incidents in 
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2017 with 8,081 reported cellphone contraband confiscations in state prison facilities 
(Georgia Department of Corrections, 2018).   
The confiscation rates of cellphone contraband highlight an alarming problem that 
has increased in urgency over the years with the exposure of a number of high-profile 
cases involving inmates in possession of cellphone contraband.  One such case involved a 
jury duty scam in which inmates within a Georgia prison contacted citizens and 
threatened them with arrest warrants for not reporting to jury duty (“Cell Extortion,” 
2015; Seville, 2016).  The unsuspecting victim would be instructed to pay a “fine” using 
Greendot cards, which were eventually traced back to the inmates (“Cell Extortion,” 
2015; Seville, 2016).  In a 2016 sting operation, 46 correctional officers in Georgia were 
indicted and later convicted and sentenced for their participation in one of the largest 
corruption scandals to affect the department (Cook, 2017).  The correctional officers were 
identified as participants in contraband smuggling—which included cocaine, 
methamphetamine, and cellphones—at numerous institutions across the state in 
conjunction with one of the state’s most problematic prison gangs—the Ghost Face 
Gangsters (Cook, 2017).  Shortly after the mass indictments of correctional officers, an 
inmate was indicted for the 2014 murder of a 9-month-old baby, which was the result of a 
retaliation hit he ordered from his prison cell on a contraband cellphone (Harris, 2016; 
Reed, 2016; Saul, 2016).  The hit was approved and ordered via cellphone by the 
inmate—a member of Sex, Money, Murder gang—and his superiors—who were serving 
time at a supermax federal facility in Colorado at the time of the murder—in retaliation 
for the murder of a fellow gang member perpetrated by the baby’s uncle (Harris, 2016; 
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Reed, 2016; Saul, 2016).  In 2018, another inmate was convicted and sentenced to life 
imprisonment plus 20 years for ordering a hit on a man who owed him $500 (Barker, 
2018; Yeomans, 2018).  The inmate ordered the hit from a contraband cellphone he had 
received while in prison serving time for a previous murder (Barker, 2018; Yeomans, 
2018).  Cases such as these present the clear and apparent dangers associated with 
cellphone contraband in prisons.   
Although cellphone contraband is often introduced by a variety of sources, 
correctional officers who participate in this form of deviant behavior create the greatest 
risk to their organization due to the associated relational impacts.  Correctional 
administrators struggle to manage cellphone contraband, which creates a wide range of 
problems both within correctional facilities and in the general public.  Because of this, 
there is a greater sense of urgency to understand the impacts of this problem from the 
perspective of those who are at greater risk due to this exposure. 
Background 
In order to understand perceptions related to cellphone contraband introduction, 
an extensive review of the relevant literature was conducted.  Deviance literature 
highlighted individual, within-group, and organizational factors such as poor pay, societal 
isolation, within-group assimilation, and job satisfaction as contributors to employee 
deviance (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Biron, 2010; Cook, 2017; Farnese, Bello, Livi, 
Barbieri, & Gubbiotti, 2016; Ferris, 2009; Ivkovic, 2005; Norman, Avey, Nimnicht, & 
Pigeon, 2010; Riley, 2017; Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998; Souryal, 2009; Thau, 
Bennett, Mitchell, & Marrs, 2009; Thompson, 2009).  However, the corrections 
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profession is underrepresented throughout this literature, which created generalizability 
concerns.  The scope of corrections literature was limited in regard to deviance and was 
primarily limited to inappropriate relationships and boundary violations (Donner, 
Maskaly, & Thompson, 2018; Mahfood, Pollock, & Longmire, 2013; Maillicoat, 2005; 
Souryal, 2009; Worley & Worley, 2016).  There was also an identifiable discrepancy 
regarding culpability (officers or inmates) in deviant workplace activities (Dial & 
Worley, 2008; Marquart, Barnhill, & Balshaw-Biddle, 2001; Worley, 2016; Worley & 
Cheeseman, 2006; Worley, Marquart, & Mullings, 2003; Worley, Tewksbury, & 
Frantzen, 2010) and a deficiency in self-report data related to correctional officers’ 
experiences with contraband activity.  The recency of contraband literature reiterated key 
concepts of deviance and corrections literature by presenting concerns with pay, job 
satisfaction, within-group socialization issues, and underreporting related to officer codes 
of silence as relative factors in contraband introduction (Burke & Owen, 2010; CAPI, 
2016; Grommon et al., 2018; Kalinich & Stojkovic, 1985; Roth, 2011; York, 2016).  
However, researchers have not provided any explanation for ethical considerations or 
climate contributions from the perspective of correctional officers.  Further, the majority 
of this information was based on secondary studies and reviews of available studies as 
opposed to direct studies.  Lastly, the climate literature reported ways in which climate 
influences organizational behaviors—especially through affective and perceptual factors 
(Ivkovic, 2005; Schneider, Ehbart, & Macey, 2013; Taxman, Cropsey, Melnick, & 
Perdoni, 2008; Trevino, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006).  However, similar to deviance 
literature, the studies’ populations consisted of non-corrections professionals which again 
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limited generalizability.  This study aimed to remedy these gaps by exploring ways in 
which contraband activity by fellow officers impacts the organizational and within-group 
perspectives of non-participatory correctional officers. 
Problem Statement 
Institutional structure, social order, and behavioral management are the primary 
responsibilities of security staff within correctional institutions (Ferdik & Smith, 2016; 
McKelvey, 1977).  Any behavior that contradicts ethical, moral, and formally established 
mores directly undercuts institutional authority as well as safe and secure operations 
within a correctional facility (Henry, 1998).  Cellphone contraband introduction by 
security staff is a contemporary example of immoral and illegal behavior that undermines 
organizational policy and standards within corrections.  Correctional experts and 
researchers agree that cellphone contraband introduction is problematic across many 
correctional departments (Cook, 2015, 2017; Graczyk, 2008; Rankin, 2015; Reed, 2016; 
Riley, 2017; Saul, 2016; Seville, 2016; Smith, 2018; Associated Press, 2018; Thompson, 
2009), warranting increased attention for the identification of suitable remedies.  Limited 
qualitative data exists that provides substantial exploration of the impact of this behavior 
relative to both organizational climate and deviancy as well as the overall correctional 
environment.  The collection and analysis of additional relevant data allows for greater 
insight into cellphone contraband introduction perpetrated by correctional officers.  
Further, it allows for additional clarification of systemic factors—including both 
institutional and social factors as well as current regulatory policies—that may exacerbate 
this particular form of occupational deviancy within correctional settings. 
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Purpose of the Study 
Cellphone contraband introduction is detrimental to institutional safety and secure 
offender management.  The current body of literature lacks specificity in regard to 
rationale behind officer participation in cellphone introduction as well as reporting 
behaviors by noncomplicit officers. Because of this, a greater need for deeper exploration 
into significant acts of deviance—in this case, cellphone contraband introduction—exists.  
In addition to causing damage within individual institutions, cellphone contraband is 
equally disruptive to the supervising agencies as well as the surrounding communities.  
Security staff are often held to a higher standard as compared to other staff (i.e., food 
service, civilian, medical, mental health, etc.) due to their perceived power and control 
within the correctional organization.  The authority ascribed to these individuals 
intensifies the negative impact associated with participation in this level of occupational 
deviancy.  The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore the perspectives of 
correctional officers (of all rankings) who have experienced contraband introduction by 
other security staff. 
Research Questions 
The following central research question and two subquestions regarding 
correctional officer cellphone contraband introduction and climate influence were 
developed based on the identified problem statement and purpose of the study. 
Central question: How do cellphone contraband violations by correctional officers 
impact the perceptions of other correctional officers regarding cellphone 
contraband prevention in state prisons? 
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SQ1: How does correctional climate encourage cellphone contraband 
introduction by correctional officers? 
SQ2: How does the correctional climate impact reporting of cellphone 
contraband violators by non-complicit officers? 
Theoretical Framework 
Victor and Cullen’s (1988) ethical climate theory was the applicable theoretical 
reference for guiding this research.  According to this theoretical tenet, organizations are 
comprised of specific ethical climates relative to “position, tenure, and workgroup 
membership” (Victor & Cullen, 1988, p. 101).  Ethical climates are identified based on 
five categories: law and code, independence, rules, caring, and instrumentalism (Victor & 
Cullen, 1988).  Victor and Cullen suggested sociocultural and organizational factors 
encourage the overall development of ethical climate, which is explained further in the 
next chapter.  This theory supported the research by accounting for the organizational and 
sociocultural influences of cellphone contraband introduction within prisons (as 
addressed in the central question and RQ1).  Additionally, ethical climate theory helped 
further exploration into the role of non-complicit correctional officers as well as their 
interactions with and perceptions of their work environments following their awareness 
of cellphone contraband introduction (as addressed in the central question and RQ2).   
Nature of the Study 
Qualitative methodology was most appropriate for this research.  Problems and 
issues in need of in-depth exploration are most suitable for qualitative research (Creswell, 
2013).  Researchers who identify a “need to study a group or population, to identify 
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variables that cannot be easily measured, or to hear silenced voices” while establishing “a 
complex, detailed understanding of an issue” (Creswell, 2013, p. 48) are best served with 
a qualitative methodological approach.  Because of the unique nature and depth of this 
problem, qualitative methodology presented as most appropriate for the examination of 
how and why cellphone contraband introduction occurs at the hands of correctional 
security staff.  Moreover, the alignment of the established purpose and corresponding 
research questions assists with the conceptualization of both known and unknown 
contributory factors that continue to counteract current preventative measures. 
Cellphone contraband introduction is a problem not experienced by society as a 
whole.  Instead, it is exclusive within a certain type of environment—correctional 
facilities—and experienced by a specific group of people—staff and inmates within the 
correctional environment.  The individuals who are the most knowledgeable of this 
particular phenomenon of interest are those who are most impacted by it on a regular 
basis—correctional officers.  As such, a phenomenological study design was employed as 
most effective in understanding the ways in which correctional officers are effected by 
cellphone contraband introduction by other officers.  This particular design choice also 
provided for exploration of underlying themes relative to the overall understanding of 
contraband introduction through the lived experiences of study participants (Creswell, 
2013).  The central purpose of phenomenological research is to provide qualitative 
insight into the lived experiences of a particular situation or phenomenon; additionally, I 
was able to focus on the experiences of the participants with limited focus on social or 
cultural norms, preconceived notions, or values in order to identify shared themes that 
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collectively explained their experiences with the established phenomenon.  Participants in 
this study consisted of a group of officers who met a specific set of criteria including 
length of time as correctional officers and previous exposure to incidents of cellphone 
contraband introduction.  I interviewed these individuals using a semistructured 
questioning strategy and analyzed their responses using phenomenological data analysis.  
Assumptions 
The assumptions of this research provided the contextual foundations for the 
study.  First, it was anticipated that participants would have differing interpretations of 
interview questions, different lived experiences as correctional officers, and different 
ethical beliefs which would inform their interview responses.  It was also expected that 
participants would answer the interview questions honestly.  Finally, I assumed that the 
findings associated with this study would be reflective of correctional officers who work 
in state prison facilities.  The nature of prison environments varies based on population, 
size, demographics, security-level, and so on; consequently, the experiences of 
correctional officers in similarly defined prison environments could relate to the 
experiences of participants identified in this study. 
Scope and Delimitations 
The scope of this study reflected the perspectives of corrections officers in order 
to supplement the qualitative literature focused on contraband introduction.  The study 
focused on the lived experiences of correctional officers exposed to this particular form 
of employee deviance.  This study does not account for the experiences of nonsecurity 
staff working within the corrections environment.  Additionally, the perspectives of 
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upper-level management and administration were also not considered.  Even though no 
two prisons operate in an identical manner, I did not incorporate facility-specific 
concerns into the research.  The outcome of this study provided some insight into the 
perspectives of those who have experienced cellphone contraband introduction by fellow 
officers as well as the impact of this behavior and how correctional officers viewed their 
organization and their coworkers as a result of such incidents.   
Limitations 
This study demonstrated a unique set of limitations relative to the problem as well 
as the population of study.  For one, the study involved participants from one 
geographical location—a state in the southeastern United States—which could impact 
generalizability to other sites.  Additionally, the study focused on the lived experiences of 
one particular subgroup within the prison staff population—correctional officers—which 
could also affect generalizability across other staff groups.  The study was also time-
limited with only one data collection event.  Because of this, the data reflected 
participants’ perspectives at a specific period in time and does not account for any 
changes that may have occurred in the passage of time since interviewing.  Researchers 
have previously addressed difficulty in accessing participants within law enforcement 
agencies due to excessive secrecy and distrust of outside authorities.  This practice, which 
often limits the availability of research data within this area, has been identified as the 
“code of silence” within law enforcement and the “correctional officer code” among 
corrections security staff.  Bureaucratic restrictions by prison administrators in efforts to 
prevent public awareness of internal problems might restrict or prevent on-site access to 
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research participants.  To account for this, I recruited and interviewed participants off-site 
in order to maintain anonymity of their voluntary participation and encourage response 
authenticity.  Even with off-site recruitment, participant reluctance due to implicit 
correctional officer codes remained a consistent limitation of this study even with 
reassurances regarding anonymity and confidentiality.  As a result, a number of 
participants who initially agreed to participate in this study subsequently declined further 
participation in data collection.  I was still able to use multiple participant responses in 
order mitigate validity concerns related to variability in experience.   
Definitions 
The following definitions of terms are provided to facilitate understanding of the 
contextual meaning of specific terms as applied to this body of research. 
Code of silence or thin blue line: As defined by Plouffe (2012), “the unwritten 
rule that a police officer does not report, complain about, or testify against a fellow police 
officer. It is also commonly referred to as the ‘thin blue line’.”  This construct makes 
research efforts involving law enforcement agencies difficult as personnel—especially 
officers—are not typically forthcoming with information (Payne, 2005).  Studies into 
misconduct or deviant behaviors are often difficult to conduct through self-report data as 
distrust and suspicion of researchers and research intent is high among officer 
participants (Payne, 2005). 
Correctional officer code: Similar to the code of silence in police organizations, 
this is an informal code of conduct that discourages speaking against fellow officers or 
violations by fellow officers, requires that officers provide unconditional support to one 
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another, and prohibits officer familiarity with and cooperation in illegal activities with 
inmates (Kauffman, 2005).  This code also reinforces isolation and separatism from other 
staff members by supporting an “us versus them” mentality among officers (Kauffman, 
2005). 
Deviance: Conduct that is generally considered by members of a social system as 
“wrong, bad, immoral, illegal, or worthy of condemnation or punishment” (Jensen, 
2007). 
Ethical climate: As an extension of organizational climate, ethical climate refers 
to the “general and pervasive characteristics of organizations, affecting a broad range of 
decisions” and is defined by five dimensions: law and code, instrumentalism, 
independence, caring, and rule (Victor & Cullen, 1988). 
Occupational deviance: For the purposes of this study, the definition of 
occupational deviance incorporates components of both Robinson and Bennett’s (1995) 
and Friedrichs’ (2002) definitions as voluntary behavior that is self-serving and 
counterproductive in nature, violating both formal and informal occupational norms and 
threatening to the well-being of the organization, its members, or both. 
Organizational climate: Fluctuating characteristic within an organization that is 
contingent upon external environmental factors such as employee behavior and attitude 
(Ashkanasy & Doris, 2018). 
Social distance: Refers to the appropriate level of social interactions between 
individuals based on relationship dynamics (Brazill, 2003).  For this research, social 
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distance will be addressed in terms of violations of appropriate social boundaries (or 
“boundary violations” in text) among correctional staff and inmates. 
Staff: Refers to all members who work within the organizational setting regardless 
of group identification or title (Mahfood et al., 2013).  In this research, correctional 
officers will be identified by their professional title in order to provide internal 
consistency and distinction from other organizational members. 
Use of force: Legitimate power granted to only police by the state that allows 
officers to use necessary force against uncooperative citizens (Beausoleil, 2012).  This 
power is generally limitless and allows officers to forcefully compel submission in order 
to protect society (Beausoleil, 2012).  It is important to note that legal acceptance of this 
granted authority does not always equate to moral legitimacy as some uses of force are 
deemed legal even when they are immoral (Beausoleil, 2012). 
Significance 
This study was significant because it provided increased understanding of 
occupational deviance—specifically in the form of cellphone contraband introduction—
among correctional officers.  The current deficiency in the available literature evinced the 
need for additional research that qualitatively explored ethical foundations within the 
correctional climate.  The majority of the literature in this area provided insight into 
occupational deviance relative to inappropriate sexual relationships/conduct with 
inmates, inmate perceptions of rogue correctional officers, as well as typologies 
associated with inmate manipulators and generalized categorical definitions of deviant 
correctional officers.  Increasing occurrences of this form of occupational deviance 
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served as further validation of the growing importance of this phenomenon.  The 
exploration of correctional officers’ experiences with contraband introduction provided 
increased insight into the role of organizational ethics and the impact of these ethical 
guidelines on staff perspectives within the work environment.  The use of participant 
responses from correctional officers who work within one of the largest correctional 
departments in the United States allowed for greater application of this study’s findings 
to the body of literature regarding prison contraband introduction.  Findings from this 
study could provide administrative insight into the organizational and social factors that 
continue to unknowingly exacerbate this problem, as well as assist with specialized 
training development and modification. 
Summary 
The gap presented in the current literature allowed for greater exploration into the 
pervasive problem of cellphone contraband introduction.  The current literature presented 
data that outlines general characteristics of individuals who participate in deviant 
workplace behaviors as well as basic typologies of officers who participate in 
occupational deviance.  Researchers have also presented economic, social, and 
environmental factors; however, none of these factors provided a solid justification for 
why these officers chose to engage in deviant behaviors.  Additionally, the literature 
provided little explanation for how these experiences affect those who were exposed to 
deviance—specifically cellphone contraband introduction—during the course of their job 
performance.  With this study, I attempted to remedy these unaddressed concerns through 
qualitatively supported correctional officer data. The next chapter provides an in-depth 
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examination of the current literature, highlights gaps, and presents justification for the 
current body of research.		 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The introduction of cellphone contraband by correctional officers remains an 
widespread problem for prison organizations.  Sometimes contraband is introduced by 
visitors or civilian staff; however, officers are just as susceptible to this form of deviance 
as non-sworn individuals.  Everyday citizens are often astonished and disheartened at the 
news that a corrections officer has been accused of introducing cellphone contraband into 
a correctional facility.  Low pay is often attributed as the greatest contributing factor to 
deviant behavior among correctional officers (Cook, 2017; Riley, 2017; Souryal, 2009; 
Thompson, 2009), and although this may be true it is not always the case.  As salaried 
employees within a single department, correctional officers make roughly the same 
amount, but not all participate in this type of behavior; therefore, it is hard to rely solely 
on low compensation as an explanation for this type of deviant behavior when it presents 
as the exception rather than the norm.  Other potential contributing factors identified 
include work-related stress (Worley, 2016), feeling unsupported or uncared for within the 
organization (Worley & Worley, 2011, 2013), feeling devalued or unappreciated by the 
organization (Worley, 2016), and low education (York, 2016).  However, even in 
consideration of these alternative possible contributors, researchers have been unable to 
unequivocally identify any one factor as the sole reason behind employee deviance in 
corrections.  Following an explanation of search strategy, this chapter examines the 
theoretical foundation that supported the basis for this research as well as the available 
literature regarding workplace deviance, corrections, contraband, and organizational 
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climate.  The major concepts identified in this literature review provided the foundation 
for the study.  
Literature Search Strategy 
Despite the number of cases illustrating the dangers of cellphone contraband, 
there is little literature available to guide correctional policies and legislature in 
determining best practices for combating this problem.  The purpose of this study was to 
qualitatively conceptualize the experiences of corrections officers exposed to cellphone 
contraband introduction by fellow officers.  This chapter provides an exhaustive review 
of the relevant literature through the use of peer-reviewed journals and articles, books, 
and government data accessed through the Thoreau multi-database system on the Walden 
University library website using keywords such as deviance, corrections officers, prison, 
corruption, code of silence, blue wall, workplace deviance, occupational deviance, 
organizational deviance, workplace corruption, ethics, ethical climate, and officer code.  
However, a review of the literature demonstrated a deficit in the literature focused on 
qualitative studies of contraband introduction and the impact it has on those who work in 
these environments.  Further, the literature was deficient in identifying the ways in which 
the organizational climate of the correctional environment contributes to deviant 
behavior, specifically pertaining to cellphone contraband introduction.  Correctional 
literature was limited to boundary violators (both inmate and correctional officers) and 
inappropriate relationships (both sexual and non-sexual) as well as typologies and 
internal contributing factors which lead to deviant behavior.  Contraband literature 
focused on quantifying the problem as opposed to qualifying it, whereas climate and 
19 
 
deviance literature applied mostly to non-corrections occupations.  The most relevant 
discussion of climate-related deviance pertained to use of force and codes of silence 
within law enforcement.  Therefore, this research contributes to the literature by 
exploring the contributions of organizational climate in contraband deviance by 
correctional officers within the workplace. 
Theoretical Foundation 
Ethical climate theory focuses on what is perceived as ethically acceptable within 
an organization (Victor & Cullen, 1988).  This theory places less emphasis on what is 
right or wrong and provides theoretical support for why employees engage in unethical 
behavior within the organization.  Victor and Cullen (1988) posited that employees may 
believe they will be rewarded and supported by the organization if they engage in 
behavior that is perceived as personally unethical but accepted within the organization 
based on a rewards and punishment system.  In other words, if an individual can 
somehow identify justification for deviant behavior, he or she is more likely to engage, 
regardless of consequences, due to reframing of what constitutes ethical behavior within 
his or her particular organization.  Further, if certain acts of deviance are tolerated and 
not punished with equal veracity, employees are more likely to believe they too will 
receive leniency, thus assuming the agency utilizes policies as passive threats unlikely to 
be enforced.  The tenets of this theory are further affected by gender, age, ethical 
development, personality traits, and stage of organizational career (Victor & Cullen, 
1988), all relevant factors within correctional facility employment.  In addition, theorists 
note that social norms, organizational form, and various firm-specific factors would serve 
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as dominant antecedents (Victor & Cullen, 1988).  In other words, the standards and 
factors specific to an organization often dominate the formation of ethics that dictate 
behavioral norms among the organization’s members. 
With specific relevance to this study, ethical climate theory supported the 
inquisition into institutional factors and social dynamics that contribute to active 
participation in contraband introduction by correctional officers.  Current research has 
identified protective factors (i.e., power bases, assignment of ethical responsibility, 
administrative support) presumed to minimize individual susceptibility to this type of 
deviance.  Ethical climate theory supported the research by allowing for exploration of 
why the behavior occurs within the correctional setting in the absence of a dichotomous 
conceptualization of right and wrong.  Instead, this theory clarified the influence of the 
development of ethical beliefs and the modification of these beliefs over periods of time 
as influenced—specifically as it relates to this research—by stage of organizational 
career, gender, ethical education, age, and personality traits.  The stage of organizational 
career as well as ethical education—which is greatly impacted based on the officer’s age 
of entry into the profession and length of career—will be of particular interest to this 
study. 
Key Concepts in the Literature 
Deviance 
Throughout the evolution of deviance literature, deviant behavior within the 
workplace has been defined and redefined a multitude of ways.  In their research on 
deviant behavior typologies, Robinson and Bennett (1995) defined employee deviance as 
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“voluntary behavior that violates significant organizational norms and in so doing 
threatens the well-being of an organization, its members, or both” (p.556), whereas 
Friedrichs (2002) conceptualized occupational deviance as self-serving, 
counterproductive acts that are in violation of formal and/or informal occupational norms.  
Deviancy by organizational standards can involve behaviors that are either ethical or a 
violation of policy or jurisdictional law or both (Friedrichs, 2002).  Robinson and Bennett 
identified four categorical definitions of employee deviance that serve as foundational 
classifications within the literature.  Production deviance, which is the least serious of all 
four categories, is defined as minor, organizationally harmful acts perpetrated by an 
employee, whereas property deviance includes acts that are significantly harmful to the 
organization (Robinson & Bennett, 1995).  Acts of deviance committed against another 
individual, or interpersonal deviance, also vary in the same severity—minor and 
serious—and are identified as either political deviance or personal aggression, 
respectively (Robinson & Bennett, 1995).  Based on their early research, Robinson and 
Bennett suggested that future research extrapolate the relevant factors that contribute to 
both socially and organizationally motivated deviance in order to better understand this 
type of employee-generated problem.  As such, many researchers have since answered 
the call to contribute to this body of literature by identifying individual, organizational, 
and interpersonal factors that are instrumental in the facilitation of workplace deviance. 
The prevailing assumption within an organization is that deviant employees are 
internally motivated to aggress against their employer.  Researchers have identified 
perceptually driven antecedents that have strong implications in workplace deviance 
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(Judge, Scott, & Ilies, 2006; Verdorfer, Steinheider, & Burkus, 2015).  Judge et al. (2006) 
found that employee job attitudes and the social context of the work environment 
strongly impact individual propensity towards organizational deviance, whereas 
personality and justice perceptions within the workplace influence acts of interpersonal 
deviance.  Verdorfer et al. (2015) also opined that employee deviance is provoked by 
perceptual beliefs created through workplace interactions such as teamwork, 
communication, decision-making.  The researchers posited that employee cynicism is 
moderated by positive work environment and socio-moral climate and as cynicism 
increases so does workplace deviance (Verdorfer et al., 2015).  Individual factors are 
relevant in understanding why employees deviate from organizational norms; however, 
research has shown that they are not the only factors worthy of consideration. 
The organization itself has some role in the deviancy of its employees and is not 
absolved of any degree of liability.  Organizational factors such as climate, attitudes, 
leadership, and socialization practices (e.g., training, mentorship, and social framing) are 
instrumental in the onset of deviant behaviors (Biron, 2010; Ivkovic, 2005; Norman et al., 
2010; Thau et al., 2009).  As proffered by Norman et al. (2010), an individual’s ability to 
align oneself with the organization impacts that person’s functioning as a successful 
employee.  Norman et al. studied the implications of organizational identification on 
psychological capital (PsyCap), organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB), and 
deviance.  PsyCap is based on four individual characteristics: self-efficacy, optimism, 
hope, and resiliency (Norman et al., 2010).  The combination of these four characteristics 
contributes to the individual’s conceptualization of self within the organization which in 
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turn contributes to behaviors exhibited within the workplace (Norman et al., 2010).  The 
researchers found that high organizational identity contributed to higher PsyCap, higher 
OCBs, and lower deviance (Norman et al., 2010).  Norman et al. posited that when the 
opposite is true, individuals are more likely to exhibit higher deviancy behaviors.  
Additionally, Thau et al. (2009) suggested that employees engage in deviant behaviors as 
resolution for negative treatment by superiors (see also Biron, 2010).  Biron’s (2010) 
findings indicated that employees establish organizational ethics based on actions 
demonstrated within the workplace, especially those of superiors, whereas Thau et al. 
identified management style as a key component in organizational perceptions of 
mistreatment.  It is suggested when supervisory support is either neglectful and/or 
abusive, employees will resort to reciprocal mistreatment as a way of retaliating against 
the organization (Biron, 2010; Thau et al., 2009). 
It has been inferred that group dynamics have a significant role in the acceptance 
or disapproval of employee deviance (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Farnese et al., 2016; 
Ferris, 2009; Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 1998).  As the moral authority within the 
correctional setting, officers have the responsibility of modeling ideal behavior and 
positive social reinforcement (Antonio, Young, & Wingeard, 2009).  Farnese et al. (2016) 
explained that socialization and mentorship serve as reinforcement for organizational 
commitment and subsequent deviance deterrence.  Further, belongingness and social 
alignment are important within any work environment as employees want to feel as 
though they have some place in their organization (Farnese et al., 2016; Ferris, 2009).  
Ferris (2009) opined that group valuation helps employees develop critical identity 
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components and self-esteem within organizations and that members engage in deviance 
when organizational and supervisory support in the development of these components are 
deficient.  On the other hand, some researchers found that group dynamics serve as 
catalyst to deviant behaviors in the workplace (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Robinson & 
O’Leary-Kelly, 1998).  Robinson and O’Leary-Kelly (1998) asserted that negative 
workplace behaviors are reinforced through group dynamics based on research into the 
socialization in work groups.  They found that individual antisocial behaviors mimicked 
those of their chosen work group and their experiences became reinforced and heightened 
by their desires for deeper alignment with their group (Robinson & O’Leary-Kelly, 
1998).  Ashforth and Anand (2003) also established socialization as a crucial component 
in the normalization of corruption and the perpetuation of deviant behaviors within 
organizations.  Based on a study of corruption normalization, three components serve as 
cornerstones in the normalization process: institutionalization, rationalization, and 
socialization.  Institutionalization promotes the routinization of corruption and 
rationalization legitimizes corrupt acts so that they become socially acceptable (Ashforth 
& Anand, 2003).  Ashforth and Anand stated that socialization reinforces corruption and 
is imparted upon newcomers so that they become indoctrinated into the perpetual cycle. 
The current deviance literature provides some insight into individual, 
organizational, and within-organizational dynamics that impact employee deviance.  The 
identification of these factors is helpful to administrators who are invested in the 
identification of deviancy markers within their organizations.  The concern, however, is 
that this literature focuses primarily on non-corrections organizations in which case 
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generalizability becomes difficult.  Additionally, it does little to address the concerns 
associated with contraband introduction among correctional officers.  In considering this 
type of deviancy in corrections, other factors must also be considered including the 
uniqueness of the corrections environment and those who work and live in this setting.  
Therefore, an examination of the corrections literature will help provide additional 
insights that will guide this research. 
Corrections 
To understand deviancy among officers, it is important to understand the 
environment in which these individuals work.  Correctional facilities are strategically 
designed to reinforce isolation among offenders from society in the form of physical and 
psychological barriers.  However, this separation not only impacts the inmate population 
housed within the walls of the facilities but also the staff who report to work within the 
prisons as well.  Prison staff are responsible for the safe and secure daily operations of 
the prison facility and must manage the responsibilities of their jobs while also facing the 
internal dangers associated with it (Maillicoat, 2005).  Scholars agree that the corrections 
literature is relatively deficient in providing a thorough examination of deviant behaviors 
such as corruption, theft, or sexual assault among correctional officers (Blackburn, 
Fowler, Mullings, & Marquart, 2011; Ross, 2013).  The current literature highlights 
contributory environmental and social factors, possible indicators, as well as 
commonalities in deviant officers.  While it provides for some understanding into deviant 
behaviors among correctional officers through the perspectives of staff as well as 
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offenders, the literature is not exhaustive and provides limited insight into a small scope 
of the problem. 
Prisons are designed to manage individuals who violate societal norms.  
Correctional facilities are reflective of the populations that they house ranging from 
minimum, medium, maximum, and supermaximum facilities (Maillicoat, 2005).  
Offenders are sentenced to prison environments as determined by the severity of their 
crimes and the length of their sentences.  The policies and rules that govern these 
facilities are established by the agency to address the needs of the offender population 
while also ensuring public safety.  Correctional officers serve as the liaisons between 
inmates and organizational management.  Because of this, correctional officers are 
recognized as the physical embodiment of order and regulation which is necessary for 
safe and secure facility management, which is also known as ‘legitimate’ (Steiner & 
Wooldredge, 2016).  Offender management within prisons is based on theoretical 
dominance  (Marquart et al., 2001) rather than any other form of domination within the 
system as staff are often outnumbered by those under their care.  For instance, one 
correctional system suggested correctional officers made up 56% of their correctional 
workforce at 5,478 members while the inmate population totaled roughly 54,000 for the 
2017 fiscal year (Georgia Department of Corrections, 2018).  As such, legitimacy among 
corrections staff plays an important role in the formation of the theoretical dominance 
that permeates within the prison environment.  Legitimacy is linked to environmental 
stability in prisons which helps minimize discord and chaos among inmates (Steiner & 
Wooldredge, 2016).  Scholars opined that the rigidity and strictness of the prison 
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environment require stability and rule enforcement in order to function safely and 
humanely (Garland, Hogan, & Lambert, 2013; Maillicoat, 2005) and the absence or 
compromise of legitimacy threatens this stability (Blackburn et al., 2011; Steiner & 
Wooldredge, 2016).  Legitimacy is most commonly compromised when correctional 
officers participate in deviant behaviors within the workplace. 
According to a number of researchers, professionalism serves as the ideal 
antagonist to corruption and deviance (Shively, 2015; Souryal, 2009; White, 1972); 
however, it has done little to curb its growth within correctional departments 
domestically and internationally (York, 2016).  Deviance in corrections is often identified 
as “inappropriate work-related activities which [correctional officers] may engage” 
(Ross, 2013, p. 111) which is vague and obscure.  Because of this ambiguity, formally 
recognized deviant behaviors are loosely classified as: deviance against the institution 
(i.e. property theft, failure to perform, leave abuse, and so on), deviance against inmates 
(e.g. inappropriate relationships with inmates, abuse of power, excessive force), deviance 
against other correctional officers (i.e. contraband introduction, discrimination or 
harassment towards coworkers, intoxication while working, and so on) (Henry, 1998; 
Ross, 2013).  Souryal (2009) identified similar categorizations for correctional officer 
deviance with slightly different defining terminology.  Nonfeasance are passive acts of 
deviance which incorporate omission or avoidance such as failure to report deviant acts 
by others or plausible deniability while misfeasance represents acts that are illegitimate 
acts committed willingly for personal gain (Souryal, 2009).  Malfeasance, on the other 
hand, are deviant acts which violate state law and/or organizational policy which includes 
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participation in contraband introduction (Souryal, 2009).  The inability of researchers to 
formalize unanimous guidelines for acts of deviance in corrections lends plausibility to 
pertinent concerns. 
Correctional literature indicates a number of potential indicators and contributors 
to correctional officer deviance which occur as a result of both environmental and social 
factors within the correctional setting.  The most common types of deviant behaviors 
among correctional officers are boundary violations and inappropriate sexual 
relationships which often serve as the precursor to contraband introduction (Blackburn et 
al., 2011; Worley, 2016).  Typically, correctional officers engage in employee deviance 
for some sort of personal gain that is either economic or sexual in nature (Blackburn et 
al., 2011; Worley, 2016).  Correctional officers are at increased susceptibility to deviance 
as inmates have an inherent desire to further perpetuate manipulative tactics during 
incarceration (Henry, 1998).  Shively (2015) asserted that offenders identify target 
employees are through perceptual weaknesses such as selective rule reinforcement, role 
insecurity, and oversharing of personal problems.  However, even though staff are 
encouraged to remain cognizant and vigilant while working with inmates and to maintain 
clear personal and professional distance in order to resist corruptibility (Ferdick, 2018; 
Shively, 2015), some officers still fall victim to deviance. 
Coupled with inmate exploitation, high workplace stress, inadequate pay, poor job 
satisfaction, and low administrative support have also been cited as some of the most 
likely contributors of employee deviance (Donner et al., 2018; Mahfood et al., 2013; 
Maillicoat, 2005; Souryal, 2009; Worley & Worley, 2016).  Correctional officers are 
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faced with an enormous amount of demands from both offenders as well as 
administrators.  In addition to these demands, high turnover and understaffing force 
correctional officers to serve in roles and capacities for which they are often undertrained 
or ill-equipped to handle.  Maillicoat (2005) highlighted workplace stress as an 
occupational mainstay for correctional officers often contributing to role ambiguity and 
conflict which other researchers correlated with deviance.  Through quantitative self-
report data on job satisfaction and work-related stress, Mahfood et al (2013) found that 
uniformed staff identified as being less satisfied with their jobs due to lower perceived 
risk.  Perceptions of risk are important in corrections as they help correctional officers 
remain attune to their environments and heighten their awareness of danger and unrest 
among inmates.  Similarly, Worley and Worley’s (2016) research on self-reported 
correctional officer boundary violations yielded findings which indicated decreased 
perception of risk and danger contributed to the onset of boundary violations.  
Participants identified insufficient pay and workplace stress as decision-making factors 
when considering deviant activities, indicating a negative correlation between stress and 
boundary violations on statistical models (Worley & Worley, 2016).  In other words, as 
work stress decreased for correctional officers, their perception of danger also decreased 
and their willingness to participate in deviance increased.  Further, increased societal 
isolation and self-identification or alignment with inmates further are suggested 




As underscored in deviance literature, administrative support impacts the way 
correctional officers interact with their work environment.  It has been suggested that 
supervisory support may have significant impact in officers’ compulsion to participate in 
work-related deviance (Garland et al., 2013; Vickovic & Griffin, 2014; Worley & 
Worley, 2011, 2013).  Through quantitative analysis, Worley and Worley (2011) 
described the protective role of support within the correctional work environment as 
helping correctional officers cope with perceived deviance among other staff.  Their 
findings based on correctional officer self-report data suggested that care, especially from 
supervisors, creates a gravitational effect among participants who reported lowered 
participation in deviant behaviors even if they believed others were behaving 
inappropriately (Worley & Worley, 2011).  This means employees are more likely to 
form bonds that help deter deviant behaviors when they feel as though other staff, 
including their supervisors, care about their well-being.  Garland et al (2013) also 
identified supervisory support as an influential factor in reducing role stress among 
correctional officers.  Correctional officers reported that job consistency and strong 
support from administration—particularly supervisors—helps with the overall 
minimization of role stress.  Further, supervisory support helps create a reliable coping 
mechanism to deal with internal work-related issues (Garland et al., 2013) which is 
necessary in stress reduction.  Utilizing secondary correctional officer self-report data, 
Worley and Worley (2013) later advised that the consequences of poor supervisory 
support include general reduction of threat perception, higher perceptions of deviance 
among others, and increased justification and participation in employee deviance.  In 
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other words, correctional officers need the support of their supervisors in order to support 
their overall organizational commitment and to reinforce the values needed to avoid 
inappropriate workplace behaviors. 
Another study utilizing correctional officer survey data also found that 
supervisors were more likely to have positive perceptions of their work environment and 
were more likely to demonstrate higher levels of affective organizational commitment as 
compared to non-supervisory officers (Vickovic & Griffin, 2014).  These perceptions 
were developed based on organizational justice, beneficial interactions with management, 
and appreciation of individual contributions to the organization (Vickovic & Griffin, 
2014).  The investigators also identified age and gender demographics as mitigating 
factors in determining commitment levels among supervisors but not among non-
supervisors, but did not provide specifics regarding these findings (Vickovic & Griffin, 
2014).  The significance of these findings illustrates the perceptual differences that exist 
within an organizational subgroup.  Lack of acknowledgement of these differences can 
contribute to unnoticed behaviors of retaliation by individuals who feel unappreciated 
and undervalued within the organization. 
Along with the classification of contributory factors related to correctional 
deviance, it is important to also examine possible indicators as well.  While some 
indicators of deviance may be inherent, most are influenced by the daily conditions 
confronted by correctional staff.  An examination of the literature provides a significant 
listing of important elements of consideration when assessing for employee deviance 
(Henry, 1998; Souryal, 2009; Donner et al., 2018).  Henry (1998) advised an overall 
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mindfulness of staff who demonstrate increased familiarity with inmates, increased 
affluence, increased complaints against particular staff, and increased time spent 
lingering in the facility when off-duty.  While Henry and Souryal (1998) agree that 
frequent vocalization of job frustration and unsatisfactory pay, Souryal also opined that 
the cyclical facilitation of deviant behavior relies heavily on the continued perpetuation 
of conspiratorial-survivalist behaviors which encourage mistrust and decreased 
transparency among staff.  Souryal also pointed out that structural isolation detaches 
officers from the realities of public scrutiny and further reinforces overall desensitization 
and perpetuation of the prison industrial complex, all of which have the potential to 
fortify justification of deviant behaviors.  Interestingly, one study on correctional officers 
correlated internal factors such as temperament, impulsiveness, and risky behaviors with 
deviancy as well as implicit approval of deviance among others (Donner et al., 2018).  
These same indicators, as impacted by job satisfaction and cynicism, have also been 
associated with adherence to an inferred ‘code of silence’ (Donner et al., 2018).  In some 
cases, the aforementioned indicators can be circumvented with proper attention to the 
contributory issues.  Yet, the reality of the situation suggests that some officers will chose 
to engage in deviant workplace behaviors regardless of precautions and discouragement. 
Correctional officers who commit deviance within their workplace do so for 
various reasons as previously identified.  The literature reveals some discrepancy in 
regards to where to assign culpability in the initiation of inappropriate staff-offender 
relationships (Dial & Worley, 2008; Marquart et al., 2001; Worley, 2016; Worley & 
Cheeseman, 2006; Worley et al., 2003; Worley et al., 2010).  Some researchers have 
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noted that certain institutional factors prelude this breach of trust, yet, disagree on where 
to place responsibility for these acts (Dial & Worley, 2008; Marquart et al., 2001).  
Correctional officers are placed in a compromising position when dealing with the inmate 
population.  As such, they are required to rely on offender labor to maintain institutional 
functioning, bargain for compliance and submission, and work within close proximity 
with inmates (Dial & Worley, 2008; Marquart et al., 2011).  This is known as a ‘norm of 
reciprocity’ which must exist in order for staff to maintain authority and domination over 
inmates in light of the limitations and conditions which exist in the prison setting (Dial & 
Worley, 2008; Marquart et al., 2011).  However, this norm of reciprocity may also open 
the door for corruption among staff members due to the relative increase in familiarity 
and decrease in boundary maintenance.  Dial and Worley (2008) opined that 
understanding the dangers associated with the norm of reciprocity should provide some 
insight into the importance of aggressively punishing the obvious culprits—the inmate 
violators.  On the other hand, Marquart et al (2011) suggested the onus be placed on 
employee violators in order to reinforce the significance of social framing and to reiterate 
the inappropriateness of boundary violations between staff and inmates.  While these 
researchers agree on the precariousness of the norm of reciprocity principle in 
corrections, they lack agreement in the identification of the instigator. 
This inability to agree is present among other corrections researchers throughout 
the literature.  For instance, Worley et al (2003) analyzed self-report inmate data to 
identify types of inmate violators.  Three typologies emerged from the data—
heartbreakers, exploiters, and hell-raisers—based on their boundary violation intentions 
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(Worley et al., 2003).  The researchers suggested that the persistence of the inmates 
coupled with their strategic approach to encouraging the boundary breach supports the 
inmate-instigator concept (Worley et al., 2003).  Worley and Cheeseman (2006) later 
supplemented this argument with their research into staff ‘non-sharable problems’ as the 
gateway to corruption and offender manipulation.  Inmate participants reported careful 
selection of staff members who were socially isolated and experiencing personal 
problems that they felt they could not share with anyone other than the inmates (Worley 
& Cheeseman, 2006).  The participants disclosed that the creation of a presumed safe 
sharing space allowed them to diminish boundaries between them and the staff member 
thereby creating opportunities for manipulation and deviance (Worley & Cheeseman, 
2006).  Based on the forethought and investment required to selectively target staff 
members, inmate violators are the likely antagonists. 
Arguably, other researchers have implied employees are the true provocateurs in 
these situations.  Worley et al (2010) research on boundary violations yielded 
consequences of inappropriate staff-offender relationships and identified preventative 
measures to avoid these violations.  Negative peer relationships, negative staff-inmate 
relationships, negative relationships among inmates, and negative repercussions for staff 
members were identified by inmate participants as resulting effects of boundary 
violations (Worley et al., 2010).  Preventative measures included improved supervision 
and policy changes directed at employees and the general prison culture (Worley et al., 
2010).  Conclusions of this research—based on inmate self-report data—places the 
burden of prevention on staff members as opposed to the inmates themselves.  Through 
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autoethnographical data, Worley (2016) also highlighted the importance of recognizing 
the employee’s role in boundary violations but cautioned against the regular practice of 
public shaming as prevention.  As a former corrections officer, Worley reported on the 
regularity of inappropriate relationships in prisons and the importance of how 
administrators approach these incidences as they occur.  In many cases, officers who are 
officially caught in precarious situations with inmates serve as examples for current 
employees.  The administration often uses these cases for public vilification and 
admonishment to deter other employees from participating in deviant behaviors with 
inmates (Worley, 2016).  However, Worley suggested that these practices may do more 
harm than good because they inadvertently reinforce feelings of alienation, isolation, and 
sometimes inadequacy as opposed to camaraderie and unity.  In other words, the 
placement of responsibility on guilty officers is not discouraged; however, administrators 
should rethink their responses to deviant behaviors in order to increase prevention 
effectiveness. 
Other interesting findings emerged throughout the corrections literature that are 
worth mentioning.  It is important to note that only one study (Worley et al., 2010) 
identified sexually inappropriate relationships as the most consequential within the prison 
setting, a finding not indicated in other studies included in the current literature.  Another 
study proffered a specific timeframe of 36 months of initial employment for deviance 
onset (Marquart et al. , 2001).  Other studies indicate certain demographics such as 
Caucasian race (Worley & Worley, 2013) and female gender (Blackburn et al., 2011; 
Dial & Worley, 2008) as possible risk variables for deviance participation.  Blackburn et 
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al. (2011) opined that women were both more likely to participate but less likely to 
condone deviant behaviors in corrections (Blackburn et al., 2011).  Lower pre-
employment scoring as well as history of rule violations were also noted as a potential 
risk variable (Marquart et al., 2001).  It is difficult, however, to ascertain whether 
individuals who meet these criteria are more likely than others to participate in deviance 
since the implications of these findings lack generalizability as they are not supported 
across the literature spectrum. 
This literature highlights the overall importance of job conditions and employee 
perceptions in countering deviant behaviors in staff.  While many forms of deviance exist 
in corrections, boundary violations—both sexual and non-sexual—serve as the precursor 
to contraband introduction.  Without the breach in personal and professional distance, 
there would be limited opportunity for manipulation and deviant behaviors.  Additionally, 
discrepancies in the accountability and acknowledgement of the general severity of 
boundary violations as a whole further contributes to the lack of insight into contraband 
activity in prisons.  Obscurities in defining the problem demonstrates the inherent 
complexity of contraband introduction in prisons.  Prison administrators struggle to 
manage this problem using available data as guidance because of insufficient clarity and 
specificity.  This study seeks to provide some resolution to these issues. 
Contraband Introduction 
The scarcity of literature regarding contraband introduction attests to the recency 
of interest in studying this problem.  Prison contraband is both a domestic and 
international problem that has no clearly identified solution (Roth, 2011; York, 2016).  
37 
 
Stability in prisons is a critical factor in safety and security management which is why it 
is reiterated across various areas of prison research, including contraband literature.  For 
years, contraband literature reflected the viewpoint that contraband was a necessary evil 
in stability maintenance because contraband contributes to perceived autonomy and 
provides resolution to the inherent deprivations associated with incarceration (Kalinich & 
Stojkovic, 1985; Grommon et al., 2018).  Kalinich and Stojkovic (1985) studied the 
impact of contraband on power dynamics and legitimacy within correctional settings and 
opined that contraband was beneficial to both staff and inmates in regard to the overall 
stability of the prison social structure.  Contraband markets—which include inaccessible 
items and items not approved by the correctional administration such as cellphones, 
drugs, weapons, gambling paraphernalia, currency, and other goods—allow inmates to 
feel as though they have retained some power and are manipulating the system while also 
allowing staff to sustain their overarching power within the system by facilitating a 
system selective punishment which heightens demand and sustains the need for the 
contraband market (Kalinich & Stojkovic, 1985; CAPI, 2016).  As stated earlier, the 
introduction of these items often comes as a result of boundary violations in the form of 
inappropriate sexual or non-sexual relationships.  However, it has been suggested that the 
development of interpersonal relationships between staff and inmates is necessary for the 
development of bonds necessary to help support the internal power structure that exists 
between staff and inmates (Kalinich & Stojkovic, 1985).  Kalinich and Stojkovic noted 
that while contraband allows for environmental stability, it also endorses increased 
secrecy and deviancy among both staff and inmates and creates and unsustainable system 
38 
 
of management.  In other words, the formation of inappropriate relationships and the 
silent exploitation of the contraband markets by staff were seemingly beneficial to prison 
administrators until they were no longer manageable. 
Over the past few decades, the research in contraband has shifted from the belief 
that contraband markets support the power structure within prison settings and assist 
administrators with the maintenance of stability to the understanding that contraband 
introduction produces dangerous and widespread consequences for those involved (Burke 
& Owen, 2010; CAPI, 2016; Grommon et al., 2018; Kalinich & Stojkovic, 1985; Roth, 
2011; York, 2016).  While earlier contraband literature attributes the utility of the 
contraband market with maintaining prison stability and overall functioning (Kalinich & 
Stojkovic, 1985), other researchers have evolved the literature to reflect the dangers 
associated with contraband introduction in correctional settings.  York (2016) inferred the 
potential for injuries and death in prison are more often than not associated with 
contraband introduction or inappropriate relationships while other researchers noted the 
risk to public safety also associated (Grommon et al., 2018).  In the hierarchy of prison 
contraband, cellphones are big ticket items because they allow inmates to remain 
connected to the outside world and continue their criminal activities while incarcerated.  
The contraband system provides a cycle of wealth for participants which is the top 
priority for those within the inmate population and correctional officers are often enticed 
by the allure of substantially supplementing their income regardless of the associated 
risks and dangers (York, 2016).  Not surprisingly, poor compensation has been associated 
with contraband smuggling as correctional officers can earn anywhere from $100-$1000 
39 
 
per phone which can significantly improve wage disparities (Burke & Owen, 2010; 
CAPI, 2016).  According to Bureau of Labor Statistics (2018), the 2017 annual wage for 
correctional officers was $43,510 which was 9% below the national per capita average.  
An official 2016 audit reported the starting salary for entry-level Georgia Department of 
Corrections correctional officers as $24,322 with a proposed increase to $27,936 during 
the 2017 fiscal year (Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts, 2016).  Based on this 
apparent income discrepancy, it is easy to see the allure of substantial income 
supplementation. 
Deviant officers involved in the contraband market are typically confronted with 
outcomes such as termination and/or legal repercussions (including fines, probation, 
incarceration, or any combination of these; York, 2016).  The ramifications of contraband 
introduction are constantly reiterated and displayed as incessant reminder for anyone with 
any interactions with prisoners.  Yet, even with the threat of a guaranteed negative 
outcome, some correctional officers still succumb to manipulation and deviance.  York’s 
review provided the first indication in this literature of the existence of a potential “thin 
blue line” and the silent reinforcement of a “code of silence” (para. 18) as explanation for 
why officers choose to engage in contraband introduction.  York suggested that a 
subculture of loyalty—similar to police organizations—exists among correctional officers 
and this subculture inadvertently perpetuates deviance among officers.  York also 
credited this subculture with underreporting of corruption by supervisors even though the 
expectation of reporting deviance is placed on all members of the organization.  In 
accordance with York, the Center for the Advancement of Public Integrity at Columbia 
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Law School (CAPI, 2016) also suggested that supervisors provide certain protections by 
covering up the deviant behaviors of other staff members.  Obstructive acts such as these 
not only impair investigation attempts but also interfere with accessing accurate 
contraband data. 
Researchers agree that contraband introduction is a widespread problem; 
however, they have been unable to accurately specify the scope of this quandary within 
corrections.  At the time of this research, Grommon et al (2018) provided the only 
quantitative data set reflective of contraband cell phones in prisons.  Grommon et al.’s 
(2018) study on confiscation totals revealed the discrepancies between internal 
confiscation data and cellphone availability in prisons.  The researchers analyzed data 
from a prison facility which utilizes a managed access system—which filters the cell 
transmissions of authorized and unauthorized cellphones—and compared it to 
confiscation totals (Grommon et al., 2018).  Findings indicated cellphone availability was 
twice as high as cellphone confiscation totals at a rate of 5 to 19 (available) per 1 
confiscated phone (Grommon et al., 2018).  This research further solidifies the position 
that the availability of accurate data is necessary in understanding the scope of cellphone 
contraband introduction. 
It is worth mentioning that job dissatisfaction and low hiring standards are also 
identified as possible contributory factors specifically related to contraband introduction 
(York, 2016).  Poor education was also mentioned as having possible correlation with 
contraband introduction (CAPI, 2016).  However, neither of these were heavily supported 
across the data.  As demonstrated, contraband literature is fairly recent with most having 
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occurred within the last decade.  The research available exhibits a limited breadth of 
understanding in the impact of contraband introduction on non-participants.  Differing 
from deviance literature and corrections literature, minimal information is provided in 
specific traits or characteristics associated with this particular act of deviance.  Few 
contributory or indicative factors that are specifically applicable to contraband 
introduction have been identified in the literature thus far.  The limited availability of 
data in this area affirms the need for additional research that will help provide greater 
understanding into this area of concern. 
Climate 
The climate of an organization attests to the interactions between the principles of 
the organization and its employees.  At the time of this research, the climate literature—
similar to the deviance literature—is heavily influenced by non-corrections related 
literature and there is very little mention of climate within the corrections literature.  
However, it is beneficial to understand how an organization’s climate relates to the 
problems that plague the environment.  This is especially true in corrections as the 
organizational climate may have a significant impact on how employees interact with 
their organizational environment and the choices that are made based on those 
interactions.  The climate literature provides insight into the establishment of 
organizational climate and the importance of climate in employee behavior. 
The concept of organizational climate centers on the individual’s perspective—
including attitudes, experiences, and descriptions—regarding his or her place of 
employment (Ivkovic, 2005; Schneider et al., 2013).  The organizational climate can 
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determine how people interact within their work environment and elicit certain 
behavioral responses based on these interactions (Taxman et al., 2008).  Climate is a 
critical factor in correctional officer job performance within the prison setting (Lugo, 
2016).  The development of ethical climate research stems from the need to understand 
the influence of morality in ethical workplace decision-making.  Early moral 
development research highlighted the influence of education and social exposure in 
cognitive reasoning and cognitive processing relative to problem-solving (Kohlberg & 
Hersh, 1977).  Kohlberg and Hersh (1977) emphasized the need to consider the impacts 
of individual choices on all members who may be affected by those choices instead of 
reasoning from a solely self-serving perspective as the foundation for moral judgment.  
The researchers opined that while moral judgment serves an important function in moral 
development, it is often not enough to constitute moral action (Kohlberg & Hersh, 1977).  
As an extension of this, Victor and Cullen (1988) assessed the organizational 
characteristics, or climates, that either influence or discourage individual moral action 
among employees.  Of the five identified climate dimensions, caring climates are most 
preferred by employees and significantly influence ethical decision-making on an 
individual level within organizations (Victor & Cullen, 1988).  The researchers opined 
that climate variation within organizations is not uncommon as organizational subunits 
have their own climates which may be in alignment or opposition to the general 
organizational climate (Victor & Cullen, 1988).  However, the presence of a caring 
climate within an organization increases employee fit and belongingness which heightens 
individual consideration for others and increases moral reasoning during ethical 
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dilemmas (Victor & Cullen, 1988).  It has been suggested that employee-focused mission 
statements may assist with influencing the development of a caring climate by 
establishing the guidelines which foster community among workers (Vidaver-Cohen, 
1998).  Therefore, the development of a caring climate within an organization may serve 
as a deterrent for deviant staff behaviors. 
Climate plays a significant role in determining organizational commitment among 
employees (Martin & Cullen, 2006; Schwepker, 2001; Trevino, Butterfield, & McCabe, 
1998).  For example, one study explored the relationship between contextual ethical 
factors (climate and culture) and ethically-motivated attitudes and behaviors in the form 
of commitment and observed unethical behavior, respectively (Trevino et al., 1998).  
Based on participants’ responses, self-interest and egoism climate dimensions were 
identified in positive association with unethical conduct while the law and code 
dimension was associated with a reduction in observed unethical behaviors (Trevino et 
al., 1998).  The findings also indicate that the combination of climate and culture have 
strong influences on ethical decision-making as employees will model the behaviors and 
examples set by ethical leaders within the organizational context (Trevino et al., 1998).  
Results of this study also indicated a positive association between employee- and 
community-focused climates and organizational commitment (Trevino et al., 1998), in 
support of Victor and Cullen’s earlier findings.  This study was unique due to the fact that 
it measured both the influences of both ethical climate and ethical culture in one study in 
order to highlight distinctions between the two constructs and the influences of both on 
employee commitment.  Schwepker (2001) later emphasized the importance of the 
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creation of an ethical climate in order to strengthen organizational commitment, enhance 
employee fit, and decrease turnover.  Ethical climate encourages rule reinforcement, 
organizational justice, and ethical activity through the implementation of policies and 
procedures, and codes of ethics (Schwepker, 2001).  Schwepker found that the overall 
establishment of an ethical climate within an organization reinforces employee 
satisfaction and commitment and discourages turnover intent because it emphasizes the 
importance of ethical action and minimizes ethical ambiguity.  The researcher highlighted 
the application of this study to one particular population—salespeople—due to their 
social isolation within the organization (Schwepker, 2001).  This similarity provides for 
increased generalizability to correctional officers because of the same social isolation 
they experience, albeit on a larger scale, as part of their occupation.  Similar to these 
studies, Martin and Cullen (2006) also surmised that employees engage in behaviors that 
reflect implicit decision-making guidelines as established by the ethical climate.  In the 
presence of caring climates, employees who feel appreciated and valued within the 
organization will reciprocate this treatment with loyalty and trustworthiness (Martin & 
Cullen, 2006).  Conversely, when employees feel the climate reflects the best interest of 
the organization and the organization emphasizes individual self-advancement for the 
sake of the organization, they will resort to organizational deviance in retaliation (Martin 
& Cullen, 2006).  Employee behavior, therefore, is a reflection of their perceived 




Correctional facilities utilize policies and procedures for offender management 
and departmental functioning but these policies are not employee- or community-focused 
and may not provide sufficient ethical guidance in light of growing concerns with 
employee deviance.  Instead, one might consider the dominate climate in corrections as 
falling within the rules and regulations dimension which has its limitations in ethical 
reinforcement.  One study conducted in an industrial setting explored climate perceptions 
and organizational misbehavior based of self-report data by supervisors and employees 
(Vardi, 2001).  Based on this data, respondents reported that organizational misbehavior 
is contingent upon the prevailing ethical climate and is manifested as both covert and 
overt acts aimed at various targets within the organization including productivity, 
property, coworkers, or the organization (Vardi, 2001).  Vardi also found that the 
organizational climate—identified as rules and regulations within this particular 
organization—prioritized the needs of the organization over employees which often 
fosters an atmosphere of deviance among employees.  Interestingly, the study also 
highlighted interpersonal differences in climate perception as managers reported climate 
from a more positive perspective than employees (Vardi, 2001).  The findings associated 
with this study suggest that rule-dominated climates may not be the answer in regulating 
deviant employee behaviors.  Another study assessed the salience of emotionality in 
ethical decision-making among employees and found that guilt and shame serve as the 
primary factors for eliciting ethical and unethical behaviors, respectively (Trevino et al., 
2006).  The study assessed the differences between those who apply ‘means’ (or 
formalists) versus ‘ends’ (or utilitarians) during problem assessment and the emotional 
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processing that drives the behavioral responses to these ethical dilemmas.  Trevino et al 
(2006) noted that adult conceptualization of right and wrong is largely influenced by two 
forms of thinking: whether the means justifies the action or whether the end result 
justifies the action.  While both formalists and utilitarians regarded moral issues as those 
involving some type of harm, utilitarians were less likely to recognize violations of 
behavioral norms as moral issues which significantly impacted their decision-making 
regarding deviant behaviors (Trevino et al. 2006).  In other words, individuals who are 
motivated by the end-result are less likely to recognize deviant behaviors as harmful 
because it does not compute as such in their problem identification process if the end 
result is somehow beneficial.  External social factors such as climate, culture, 
consideration for others, peer and leadership modeling, organizational justice, and 
rewards also influenced ethical decision-making and play a role in behavior management 
(Trevion et al., 2006).  The role of climate as an informal regulator in employee 
behavioral management deems it worthy of organizational attention when confronting 
deviancy in the work environment.  Findings of this study indicated individuals who 
experience guilt were more likely to resolve moral dilemmas with ethical behavior 
because of the possible infliction of harm on others while individuals who experience 
shame were more likely to respond with unethical behaviors in order to deter self-
inflicted pain (Trevino et al., 2006).  The emotional guidelines associated with behavioral 
responses are also further reinforced by climate factors such as employee-focused versus 
organization-focused climate considerations as previously established in earlier climate 
research.  Trevino et al. (2006) also opined that both individuals with internal loci of 
47 
 
control and women have increased sensitivity in identifying ethical issues, a finding not 
mentioned in other related studies.  Interestingly, the researchers noted that older 
employees or employees with longer tenure presented with lower moral judgment scores 
(Trevino et al., 2006, see also Victor & Cullen, 1988).  This finding suggests the 
possibility of increased desensitization to unethical behaviors in those with longer job 
history, which was later reiterated in research on whistleblowing behaviors and ethics 
perceptions among supervisors. 
Researchers have also identified tenure as having a significant impact on ethical 
reporting behaviors in law enforcement (Dennehy & Nantel, 2006; Rothwell & Baldwin, 
2007).  These bodies of research represent a limited group of literature that explains 
climate considerations within law enforcement professions.  Dennehy and Nantel (2006) 
concurred that camaraderie amongst corrections officers created an “us versus them” 
mentality that reinforced the code of silence principle.  The code of silence discouraged 
reporting of misconduct and also implicitly endorsed unethical behavior due to the 
diminished risk of reporting and associated disciplinary sanction (Dennehy & Nantel, 
2006).  This suggests that correctional climate within the correctional setting allows the 
code of silence to reign supreme when it is not employee-focused and prioritizes 
organizational needs over the safety and concern of staff.  Further, when correctional 
climates are left unchecked and deviant behavior is not addressed both officers and 
offenders react accordingly.  Dennehy and Nantel opined that uniform accountability of 
staff is necessary for overall climate management and improvement.  Additionally, 
Rothwell and Baldwin (2007) described policing as an organization adhering to the law 
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and code climate in which case officers base ethical decisions off of what they are taught 
in trainings and field supervision.  It is important to note that ethical dilemmas not 
addressed through these forms of instruction are often decided based on discretion and 
individual information processing.  As such, some officers engage in unethical behaviors 
during employment which forces other officers to either accept or report the behavior.  
Reporting employee misconduct, known as whistleblowing, is often discouraged among 
officers and even though failure to do so is unlawful (Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007).  The 
results of Rothwell and Baldwin’s research indicated an employee-focused climate—
friendship or team climate—as positively related to willingness to report misconduct; 
however, this same climate counteracted willingness to report amongst longer tenured 
employees.  That is, police officers who feel a sense of community and belongingness 
may be more willing to report misconduct as a means of positively addressing the well-
being of fellow officers.  Yet, older or more established officers may be less willing to 
report others in the same climate due to their sense of camaraderie and loyalty to one 
another.  Rothwell and Baldwin also implied that longer-serving officers may have 
increased exposure to deviant behaviors among coworkers and refrain from reporting in 
accordance with feelings of cynicism and despondence towards the organization. 
Other researchers have analyzed the effects of ethical climate on employee 
deviance (Chen, Chen, & Liu, 2013; Trevino, Weaver, & Brown, 2008; Hsieh & Wang, 
2016).  Trevino et al. (2008) posited that social identification contributed to 
organizational identity, one’s feelings towards the organization, and possible unethical 
behavioral responses to organizational problems.  Individuals who felt detached from 
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their organization were likely to develop feelings of cynicism and perceived 
organizational ethics as less favorable (Trevino et al., 2008).  The findings also indicated 
that supervisors were more likely to relate to the organization and have increased positive 
perceptions towards their organization in comparison to non-supervisors (Trevino et al., 
2008).  Further, supervisors were also more likely to recognize the ethical climate of the 
organization as both positive and supportive of employee reporting behaviors during 
ethical concerns whereas employees perceive the opposite to be true (Trevino et al., 
2008).  Non-supervisory employees in this study were more likely to perceive the ethical 
climate as one that was organization-focused and motivated to conceal deviant behaviors 
for the benefit of the organization (Trevino et al., 2008).  This is suggestive of the 
possibility that the separation in rank between employees and supervisors not only creates 
a physical divide but also alters the perceptual realities of each groups’ interactions with 
the work environment.  Employees may be more likely to feel emotionally detached from 
their organization which may provide subconscious justification for active or passive 
participation in deviant activities.  Chen et al. (2013) also investigated the role of 
negative emotional experiences and employee deviance and found that employees who 
have negative emotional experiences related to their job reported a higher propensity to 
engage in workplace deviance.  Additionally, results indicated specific ethical climates 
contributed to negative affectivity (NA) and deviance.  Chen et al. (2013) reported the 
significance of an instrumental climate in reinforcing negative affectivity and increased 
employee deviance while a caring climate contributed to positive affectivity and 
decreased deviance.  In other words, employees are likely to utilize emotional 
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experiences to make sense of their work environment and react according to those 
experiences.  Hsieh and Wang (2016) also determined that perceived ethical climate 
informs decision-making relative to organizational deviance.  Similar to Chen et al.’s 
study (2013), participants in this study processed work-related ethical dilemmas on an 
individual-level through cognitive, emotional, and attitudinal reasoning (Hsieh & Wang, 
2016).  As part of this process, perceived ethical climate assisted with individual-level 
processing based on previous organizational interactions and helped employees 
determine whether or not to engage in organizational deviance (Hsieh & Wang, 2016).  
Findings also suggested job satisfaction as demonstrating a moderative effect on PEC and 
subsequent OD (see also Schwepker, 2001).  Therefore, it is inferred that positive 
perceived ethical climate is reflective of positive organizational interactions which 
decreases individual-level propensity to engage in organizational deviance. 
As presented in other areas of the literature, socialization is an important factor in 
the development and sustenance of organizational climate.  Organizational socialization 
provides reinforcement of formal and informal practices for both new and seasoned 
employees, which is especially important for corrections staff as they adjust to their roles 
and social seclusion (Farnese et al., 2016).  As previously reported, deviance in 
corrections occurs at a much higher rate than data can account for which places a number 
of employees in a position of dissonance regarding decision-making such as 
whistleblowing, active or passive participation, attrition, and so on (Robinson & 
O’Leary-Kelly, 1998).  Ashforth and Anand (2003) suggested this dissonance is 
necessary in corruption deterrence as it encourages non-deviant officers to identify an 
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appropriate response that demonstrates acceptance or denial of such behaviors.  However, 
not everyone is prompted by the discomfort that emerges from moral awareness to 
engage in counter-deviant behaviors.  In their study of unethical behavior and 
organizational systems, Martin, Kish-Gephart and Detert (2013) opined that in some 
positive ethical climates a narrow focus on facilitating ethical behaviors within the 
organization inadvertently allows some unethical behavior to go unnoticed and 
unaddressed.  The organizational members then choose to engage in unethical behaviors 
through cognitive distortion and irrational justification (Martin et al., 2013).  Similar to 
Trevino et al.’s (2006) findings, Martin et al. (2013) implied that this rationalization is 
based on the ability to satisfy self-serving means through unethical actions with little 
consideration for the widespread effects.  Poor accountability for unethical behaviors 
further espouses deviant activity even if the organizational climate discourages such 
behaviors because participants are able to justify their actions in a way that decreases 
their internal discomfort.  This has the potential to reach others through group identity 
and increased desires for social alignment.  Another study of non-corrections 
professionals noted that group relatability and group identity were reinforced through 
positive ethical climates (Goldman & Tabak, 2010).  Further the interactions facilitated 
through these group dynamics encouraged interpersonal considerations and supported 
group benevolence—a deterrent of deviant employee behaviors (Goldman & Tabak, 
2010).  Additionally, scholars highlighted the importance of belongingness in behavioral 
regulation noting an apparent deviation from internal moral standards when confronted 
with group standards of morality (Pagliaro, Presti, Barattucci, Giannella, & Barretto, 
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2018).  The findings indicated that participants were more likely to select behavioral 
responses that were reflective of the organizational climate while also in consideration of 
their group alignment (Pagliaro et al., 2018).  Self-interest climates were more likely to 
elicit responses that resulted from moral disengagement and encouraged deviance while 
friendship climates, like caring climates, were more likely to elicit feelings of 
belongingness and deter deviant responses (Pagliaro et al., 2018).  This is an important 
consideration as group assimilation and alignment are predominate socialization 
dynamics within prisons and among corrections officers.  While individuals are 
responsible for the development of their personal moral character, this research has 
demonstrated the counteractive effects of group dynamics in the enactment of moral 
standards within the workplace. 
Organizational climate also informs decision-making regarding deviant workplace 
behaviors.  This literature has explained that decision-making among employees is 
predominately based on emotional responses to ethical situations.  Employees formulate 
responses to deviance based on how they feel about the organization, their social group 
within the organization, and their perceptions of how the organization and social groups 
feel towards them.  It is apparent that moral calibration outside of employment is often 
diminished or completely disregarded when faced with ethical concerns within their 
organization.  As a result, it is important for organizations to consider the type of climate 
that is fostered and how that climate is perceived by employees in order to confront 
issues regarding deviance.  This literature, however, was not thoroughly representative of 
law enforcement or corrections and still left unanswered questions.  The literature does 
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not provide explanations for climate considerations in regard to serious deviance such as 
contraband introduction.  The literature also does not provide insight into how officers 
perceive the organizational climate following exposure of contraband introduction. 
Summary 
The current literature provided general insight into deviance, corrections, 
contraband introduction, and the influence of climate within the organization.  Both 
deviance and climate literature highlighted the influence of organizational and social 
factors that contribute to deviance within the workplace.  The majority of these studies 
reflected non-corrections populations which created concerns regarding generalizability 
of results for this unique population.  Additionally, the climate literature was heavily 
supported by research that addressed the impact of emotionality in ethical problem-
solving.  The corrections and contraband introduction literatures established economic 
and interpersonal concerns as the factors most likely to contribute to correctional officer 
deviance.  However, consideration for the consistency of these factors across all 
demographics did not fully substantiate these as causal influences in this form of officer 
deviance.  Neither body of research presented perceptual data of officers who have dealt 
with the residual effects of contraband introduction by fellow officers and the concerns 
that come along with awareness of such behavior by other officers.  This body of research 
attempted to resolve this gap through the qualitative exploration of officer perspectives as 




Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore the perspectives of 
correctional officers (of all rankings) who have experienced contraband introduction by 
other security staff.  This chapter provides an overview of the research design, the 
purpose in this particular design selection, as well as the role of the researcher.  This 
chapter also highlights participant recruitment and selection, data collection, and data 
analysis.  Ethical concerns and methodological rigor are also addressed in the contents of 
this chapter, which segues into the study’s findings as presented in chapter four. 
Research Design and Rationale 
Research questions regarding correctional officer contraband introduction and 
climate influence were developed based on the identified problem statement and purpose 
of the study. 
Central question: How do cellphone contraband violations by correctional officers 
impact the perceptions of other correctional officers regarding cellphone 
contraband prevention in state prisons?  
SQ1: How does correctional climate encourage contraband introduction by 
correctional officers? 
SQ2: How does the correctional climate impact reporting of contraband 
violators by non-complicit officers?   
These questions arose as a result of the need to explore perspectives regarding 
cellphone contraband introduction by correctional officers and understand the impact the 
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decision to participate in this particular form of deviance has on non-participatory 
officers.  I used a transcendental phenomenological study to highlight key concepts 
relative to the lived experiences of those with previous exposure to cellphone contraband 
introduction.  Transcendental phenomenology focuses more on descriptions of 
participants’ experiences as opposed to the interpretations of the researcher (Moustakas, 
1994).  The expectation was that the participants’ experiences would produce themes that 
would enhance the current knowledge associated with this concept.  Through this study I 
was able to assess how cellphone contraband introduction impacts officers’ perceptions 
of the organization, the work environment, social interactions, and reporting behaviors.  I 
was also able to inquire into the factors (e.g. organizational, environmental, and social) 
that influence ethical decision-making regarding participation and reporting deviant 
activities. 
Role of the Researcher 
As the researcher in this study, I served in the capacity of observer in order to 
present the perspectives of participants based on their lived experiences.  I did not 
observe in the traditional sense but served as an interviewer documenting the experiences 
of those who had some direct experience with the phenomenon of interest.  After 
reviewing the descriptions provided by the participants, I identified themes relevant to the 
phenomenon of study and reported findings based on this information.  I had no prior 
personal relationships with any of the participants involved in the study.  Although I had 
minimal prior experience with the phenomenon of interest as a former corrections 
employee, this experience was not similar to that experienced by corrections officers.  
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Moustakas (1994) recommends bracketing—or  epoché, which is a process of identifying 
and blocking out personal biases associated with the phenomenon of interest prior to 
commencement of research interviews—to ensure that my personal experiences would 
not interfere with my objectivity.   
Methodology 
Participant Selection Logic 
I initially anticipated identifying correctional officers throughout one southeastern 
state as participants for this study.  To achieve this, I utilized a specific type of purposeful 
sampling—criterion sampling—to identify research participants.  Criterion sampling 
allows for the utilization of information-rich cases that meet some criterion as established 
by the nature of the research (Palinkas et al., 2015).  Specifically, criterion-i sampling 
allows for the identification and selection of participants based on predetermined 
criterion of importance as opposed to criterion-e sampling, which focuses on the selection 
of outlier cases that do not fall within the identified criterion (Palinkas et al., 2015).  The 
identified research questions indicated the use of criterion-i sampling as most appropriate 
in the strategical selection of research participants who could provide rich, useful data.  
The criteria for participation in this particular study were 
• tenure—at least 24 months post-law enforcement certification (peace or 
sworn) employment as a correctional officer, and 
• exposure—knowledge of at least one incident involving contraband 
introduction into the facility during current tenure.  This knowledge may come 
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as secondary information provided following the incident from other officers 
or supervisors. 
Beginning December 19, 2019 , I circulated a general announcement that included 
my contact information and requested voluntary participation in the study.  Voluntary 
participants who contacted me were subsequently screened according to the 
predetermined criterion and selected based on fit.  Initially, I sought a range of eight to 10 
officers for interview to reflect on their experiences with contraband introduction 
exposure during their tenure.  This range was identified due to the detail-oriented nature 
of the study and the general recommendation of smaller sample sizes in qualitative 
inquiry by previous scholars.  Dukes (1984) and Riemen (1986) both suggested no more 
than 10 individuals for a phenomenological study in order to ensure that the researcher 
pays adequate attention to detail in documenting the lived experiences of participants (as 
cited in Creswell, 2013).  This smaller sample size allowed for greater saturation of data 
as I was able to spend more time extrapolating information from participants that was 
fully reflective of their experience with contraband introduction in their profession.  The 
recollections of these experiences were then used to detail the phenomenon in a way that 
was reflective of the impacts of contraband introduction. 
Instrumentation 
This study incorporated an interview protocol (see Appendix A) for data 
collection in response to all stated research questions.  The interview protocol was not a 
duplicate of previous interview protocols and was developed by me.  The interview 
protocol consisted of semistructured, open-ended questions that encouraged in-depth 
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reflection of personal experiences relevant to contraband introduction.  The interview 
questions were developed as an extension of the central research question and also 
reflected the identified sub-questions.  The framing of the protocol questions related 
directly to the underlying theoretical foundation and elicited responses that described the 
phenomenon relative to ethical climate theory. The development of interview questions 
based on both the research question and the application of ethical climate theory ensured 
the elicited data was reflective of the phenomenon.  
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
Participants were allowed to decide on an interview format—in-person or video 
conference—that was not cumbersome for the them.  I reminded participants that their 
voluntary participation was not an extension of their employment and not subject to 
review by their employer.  This was done to ensure participants were interviewed as 
private citizens without oversight by the department.  The participant interviews were 
conducted solely by me.  The interview process occurred only once and was expected to 
last no more than 1 hour 45 minutes.  Interviews were recorded via audio recorder, which 
I tested for accuracy and functionality prior to the interview.  A backup audio recorder 
was also used in the event of malfunction of the primary recorder.  In the event that I 
would not able to secure enough participants through the original recruitment method, 
participants would be asked to provide two additional participant referrals in order to 
identify additional individuals who met the predetermined criteria and were willing to 
participate in this study.  At the conclusion of each interview, I debriefed the participants 
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by providing basic information regarding the nature of the study, allowing for questions 
or concerns on behalf of the participant, and reiterating confidentiality measures. 
Data Analysis Plan 
Phenomenological data analysis was used to process and analyze the data 
collected.  I transcribed the collected data myself to ensure accuracy in textual 
construction of interview data.  Following transcription, I identified significant statements 
in the transcripts in a process called horizonalization (see Moustakas, 1994).  These 
significant statements serve as textual representations of the participants’ experiences 
relevant to the phenomenon of interest.  Horizonalization produced clusters of meaning 
that highlighted the significant themes presented in the data.  I identified initial codes 
based on the horizonalization data and later recoded this data to determine consistencies 
and inconsistencies in themes, at which time relevant textural and structural descriptions 
emerged as data references. Textural descriptions are written descriptions of the 
participants’ experiences as reflected in the statements and themes identified from the 
data, whereas structural descriptions provide contextual value to these experiences by 
also incorporating relevant situational influences as indicated by these themes and 
statements (Moustakas, 1994).  The difference between these descriptions is that textural 
descriptions reflect what was experienced while structural descriptions reflect how the 
phenomenon was experienced.  Both descriptions were used to establish the essence (i.e., 
the shared experiences of the participants) of the phenomenological study. 
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Issues of Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness—credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability—
was established through a number of practices throughout the initial stages of this study.  
I clarified any pre-existing biases through epoché—or bracketing—in order to block out 
any predetermined judgments and substantiate researcher objectivity. I also clarified the 
existence and impacts of any previous experiences and prejudices relative to the 
phenomenon of interest, which helped minimize the influence of any subjective 
interpretations.  The participant selection process also helped reaffirm trustworthiness 
through variation in participant selection.  The two primary criteria—tenure and 
exposure—were used to vet potential participants.  Other demographic information such 
as age, gender, race, and socioeconomic status were not applied as selection criteria in 
order to maintain heterogeneity in the sample.  This allowed for the application of a 
variety of perspectives with the expectation that this sample would be reflective of the 
correctional officer population.  Throughout the research process, I maintained a 
reflective journal for the disclosure of private reflections that could have produced undue 
influence on the study.  Following the initial coding process, I undertook a code-recode 
procedure to confirm the dependability of the results.  Additionally, member checking 
assisted with confirming my interpretations of the data in order to safeguard the 
credibility of the research.  For this step, participants who elected to review the data 





For ethical considerations, the experiences and reflections of the participants were 
not a reflection of the organization for which they work.  Participants were attesting to 
their experiences within their professional capacity and were not speaking on behalf of 
the department.  Participants were more likely to withhold information or speak in terms 
that positively reflected the agency if they were subjected to study participation on-site.  
In an attempt to secure authenticity in participant responses, I opted to interview officers 
as private citizens.  Therefore, the participant recruitment and study commencement did 
not take place at any particular worksite or through participation with any department of 
corrections.  I also informed participants that their responses and participation were 
voluntary and independent of their employers.  The content of the interview was 
reflective of the officers’ lived experiences with the phenomenon itself.  Further, I 
encouraged the participants not to speak on behalf of the department and to speak 
specifically in regard to their personal experiences with exposure to cellphone contraband 
introduction.  I obtained permission from the Walden University Institutional Review 
Board (approval # 12-17-19-0525989) to conduct a study involving human subjects prior 
to recruitment and additional investigation efforts.  I anticipated no harm and very 
minimal (if any) risk to the participants, which was consistent throughout the research 
process.  Recruitment efforts ensured the anonymity of study participants who contacted 
me to express participation interest based on their review of the recruitment 
announcement placed on various social media platforms including LinkedIn, Facebook, 
and Twitter.  Initial contact with participants provided them with an overview of the 
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purpose of study and their role as participants.  I provided participants with informed 
consent forms, which they had the option to sign, and an opportunity to ask questions or 
raise concerns regarding their participation.  Participants were informed that the data 
related to this study would be shared with necessary members of the research committee 
and that final results would be provided for participants’ review.  I remained mindful 
during the interview process of sharing information that could bias or encourage false 
reporting by participants.  This research incorporated anonymity to promote participants’ 
comfort in participation.  I also protected participants’ identities by developing composite 
profiles in order to respect privacy concerns.  In order to avoid one-sided findings, I have 
reported all perspectives relative to the study’s findings.  When confronted with early 
withdrawals or participation refusals, I incorporated a referral process in order to seek out 
additional participants.  Refusals and withdrawals were documented as part of the 
findings in the study in order to maintain trustworthiness and transparency in the study.  
Electronic data has been stored on an encrypted external drive which has been placed in a 
locked file safe.  If necessary, physical copies of documentation (such as forms requiring 
signatures) would be scanned to the electronic drive and physical copies would also be 
placed in the locked file safe for data security and storage.  Additionally, these physical 
copies would be stored and filed separate from research data with the university’s 
research department.  The data related to this study will be stored for a period of no less 




The concepts outlined in this chapter highlighted the process by which this study 
explored the perspectives of correctional officers exposed to contraband introduction.  
The research design, rationale, and researcher role provided the foundation on which the 
current study was based.  The methodology included the steps that were incorporated to 
further identify viable participants and data collection and analysis procedures.  Concerns 
related to trustworthiness and ethicality of the study process were also discussed at 




Chapter 4: Results 
Introduction 
The understanding of correctional officer perspectives on cellphone contraband 
introduction by fellow officers was central to this particular study.  Through interview 
questioning, I sought answers to the following questions: How do cellphone contraband 
violations by correctional officers impact the perceptions of other correctional officers 
regarding cellphone contraband prevention in state prisons?  How does correctional 
climate encourage cellphone contraband introduction by correctional officers?  How does 
the correctional climate impact reporting of contraband violators by non-complicit 
officers?  This chapter provides details related to the data collection and data analysis 
processes as well as the final results, which will be interpreted in the final chapter of this 
study. 
Setting 
In accordance with the recruitment process described in the previous chapter, a 
recruitment announcement was circulated on various social media platforms including 
LinkedIn, Facebook, and Twitter on December 19, 2019.  The conditions of the study 
were as expected in regard to working with individuals in law enforcement.  Only one 
participant mentioned specific influential organizational conditions present within the 
department that could have contributed to decreased participation. This participant 
reported organizational downsizing due to budget cuts and stated that a number of 
employees throughout the organization were concerned with job stability and security. 
This departmental shift could have discouraged participation if employees believed the 
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organization would find out about their participation and use it against them. Because this 
information was provided early in the study, I took it into consideration during the 
remainder of the recruitment process.  
Overall, I experienced some difficulty in securing voluntary participants from the 
targeted area of the study.  In response to this obstacle, I attempted to secure referrals 
from participants identified in both the recruitment process as well as those who 
participated in data collection.  However, this still did not generate additional participants 
who were willing to provide data for this research.  Based on these factors, I opted to 
collect and analyze data based on the available participants.   
Demographics 
Approximately 14 individuals initially contacted me about participating in the 
study.  For the purposes of this study, all 14 will be considered participants as they all 
scheduled interviews with me with the intent of participating in the data collection 
process.  The demographics of the overall participant pool were variant, and demographic 
information relevant to this study was provided during pre-screen interactions.  These 





Demographic Data: Initial Recruitment Sample 
Participant Age Gender Tenure Rank 
Participant 1 39 F 7 years Correctional Officer II 
Participant 2 59 F 28 years Correctional Officer II 
Participant 3 28 M 6 years Lieutenant 
Participant 4 32 M 10 years Captain 
Participant 5 42 F 16 years Lieutenant 
Participant 6 47 M 19 years Correctional Officer II 
Participant 7 52 F 20 years Correctional Officer II 
Participant 8 50 F 27 years Sergeant 
Participant 9 32 F 4 years Correctional Officer II 
Participant 10 35 F 4 years Sergeant 
Participant 11 39 F 10 years Sergeant 
Participant 12 47 F 13 years Correctional Officer II 
Participant 13 33 M 5 years Sergeant 
Participant 14 35 M 3 years Correctional Officer II 
 
Seven of the individuals who contacted me to participate in this study held the 
rank of Correctional Officer II (COII).  This rank is established by a tenure of more than 
one year as a Correctional Officer I, which is the entry rank for all individuals hired as 
officers in correctional facilities.  Four of the individuals held the rank of sergeant, which 
is a supervisory role one step above correctional officer.  These individuals are the next in 
rank to correctional officers and are generally responsible for mid-level management 
tasks.  Two individuals were ranked as lieutenants who are one rank above sergeants and 
two ranks above correctional officers.  These individuals are considered upper middle 
management within the facilities and are responsible for specific shifts and areas of 
coverage (i.e., general and specialized housing, recruitment, transportation, special 
operations, and physical areas of the prison).  One individual was the highest ranked of 
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the volunteers and was promoted to captain of his facility prior to data collection.  The 
captain of the facility is considered the chief of security and all security staff report to this 
individual.  This person is responsible for the day-to-day operations of staff and offenders 
within the facility and serves as the head of security who reports to administrative staff 
within the facility. 
Even though I emphasized the independence of the research from any particular 
corrections organization, there was still some reluctance by some participants to follow 
through with interviewing once scheduled.  Three individuals (Participants 6, 7, and 10) 
contacted me various numbers of days prior to their scheduled interviews to cancel, 
generally citing concerns of retaliation and possible reprimand.  One individual 
(Participant 4), who initially agreed to be interviewed, was offered a promotion 
approximately one week prior to the scheduled interview. As a result, this person was 
reluctant and subsequently declined interview as a result of fear of possibly jeopardizing 
his new position.  One other individual (Participant 9) contacted me and scheduled a day 
for interviewing. However, on the day of the scheduled interview, the individual reported 
to me that her supervisor advised against the interview without internal departmental 
approval even though I had told her that she would be participating as a private citizen.  
Another individual (Participant 5), who was scheduled for interview, was arrested for 
suspected contraband introduction prior to her interview and stated that her lawyer 
advised against participation in this study due to potential legal ramifications.  One other 
participant (Participant 12) was also arrested for charges unrelated to her employment but 
was subsequently terminated and declined further participation. Four additional 
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individuals (Participants 3, 11, 13, and 14) scheduled interviews, but I was unable contact 
them following the initial scheduling.  As a result, Participants 3 through 7 and 
Participants 9 through 14 were not included in the remainder of the data collection 
process (see Table 2).   
Table 2 
 
Demographic Data: Initial Recruitment Sample with Withdrawal Reasons  
Participant Age Gender Tenure Rank Reason for withdrawing 
participation 
Participant 1 39 F 7 years Correctional Officer II N/A-final participant 
Participant 2 59 F 28 years Correctional Officer II N/A-final participant 
Participant 3 28 M 6 years Lieutenant Scheduled, no follow-up 
Participant 4 32 M 10 years Captain Received promotion 
Participant 5 42 F 16 years Lieutenant Arrested for contraband 
introduction 
Participant 6 47 M 19 years Correctional Officer II Reprimand concerns 
Participant 7 52 F 20 years Correctional Officer II Reprimand concerns 
Participant 8 50 F 27 years Sergeant N/A-final participant 
Participant 9 32 F 4 years Correctional Officer II Supervisor advised against 
participation 
Participant 10 35 F 4 years Sergeant Retaliation concerns 
Participant 11 39 F 10 years Sergeant Scheduled, no follow-up 
Participant 12 47 F 13 years Correctional Officer II Arrested for undisclosed 
reasons 
Participant 13 33 M 5 years Sergeant Scheduled, no follow-up 
Participant 14 35 M 3 years Correctional Officer II Scheduled, no follow-up 
 
In contrast to those who completed the data collection process, these participants’ 
decisions to discontinue participation prior to interviewing also provided substantive 
value related to study limitations, which is explained in greater detail in later sections.  
The remaining three participants—Participants 1, 2, and 8—provided interview data that 





Demographic Data: Final Interview Participants 
Participant Age Gender Tenure Rank 
Participant 1 39 F 7 years Correctional Officer II 
Participant 2 59 F 28 years Correctional Officer II 
Participant 8 50 F 27 years Sergeant 
 
More women than men contacted me for during recruitment for this study.  A 
total of nine female and five male participants were a part of the overall sample.  The 
ranks of these individuals were diverse across the entry- and mid-level management roles 
with five women and two men representing the Correctional Officer II group and three 
women and one man representing the sergeant group.  The only group that showed equal 
representation was the rank of lieutenant with one male and one female participant.  The 
only captain represented in the recruitment sample was male. Of these initial volunteers, 
the 11 who subsequently withdrew participation were: three female COIIs, two male 
COIIs, two female sergeants, one male sergeant, both the male and female lieutenants, 
and the male captain.   
The ages of the sample of nonparticipating volunteers ranged from 28 to 52 years 
old with an average age of 38.36 years for the group.  The tenures of these individuals 
were between 3 and 20 years with an average length of 10 years on the job.  The 
youngest volunteer in this group was a 28-year-old male with the second highest rank but 
one of the shortest tenures at 6 years.  The shortest-tenured employee of the initial 
nonparticipating recruits was a 35-year-old male with the lowest rank (COII) and 3 years 
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of service, whereas the oldest and longest-tenured of these individuals was a 50-year-old 
female COII with 20 years of service.   
For the final collection of data, those who elected to participate were all females 
and maintained the ranks of Correctional Officer II (n = 2) and sergeant (n = 1).  The 
ages represented by those who were interviewed were 39, 50, and 59 years old—an 
average age of 49.33—with a significant gap of 20 years between the oldest and youngest 
participants.  Of this cohort, the highest-ranked participant—a 50-year-old female 
sergeant with 27 years of service—was neither the oldest nor the individual with the 
longest tenure. The youngest final participant (a 39-year-old female) was the shortest-
tenured (7 years) and shared rank (COII) with the oldest participant (a 59-year-old 
female) who was also the longest-tenured (28 years).  The average tenure within this 
group was 20.67 years with a range of 21 years between the shortest- and longest-tenured 
participants of the interview.  
Data Collection 
As stated in the social media announcement, I explained during preinterview 
conversations that interviews would be conducted away from employment sites to 
encourage confidentiality and anonymity.  Additionally, conducting off-site interviews 
would also build trust between the researcher and the interviewees as this has been cited 
as a limitation in research by previous correctional researchers.  Based on withdrawal 
rates during the recruitment phase, I remained cognizant of potential underlying concerns 
related to participants answering questions regarding deviant employee behaviors.  In 
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attempts to overcome these preinterview concerns, these individuals were reminded that 
anonymity and confidentiality would be observed throughout the research process.  
In total, three participants (Participants 1, 2, and 8) were interviewed as part of 
this study.  This number was significantly lower than the originally stated range of 8 to 
10 participants due to the factors mentioned earlier in the chapter.  Because 
phenomenological research emphasizes the importance of depth and quality in 
understanding individual experiences, this number was identified as sufficient in meeting 
the needs of this study.  Participants were interviewed at their convenience through video 
conferencing due to weather and travel concerns.  The participants were provided with 
the informed consent via email prior to the scheduled interview and verbally confirmed 
their consent as well.  Interviews ranged in time from approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour 
and 10 minutes and each interview was recorded on two audio recorders.   
Participants were asked two preinterview questions to confirm on-record the 
length of time as a corrections officer and the age each began working as an officer. 
These questions were followed by 12 main interview questions that allowed for 
elaboration on individual experience with exposure to cellphone contraband introduction 
and reporting behaviors regarding this activity. The main interview questions often 
provided opportunity for expansion through follow-up questioning, which allowed for 
greater depth and detail in understanding the phenomenon of interest.  The questions 
were categorically divided to address perceptions of cellphone contraband violators and 
the work environment as well as perceptions of reporting behaviors.  Sample questions 
include the following: 
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• In your opinion, why do you believe some correctional officers participate in 
cellphone contraband introduction and why do you think others do not? 
• What role does the structural rigidity (rules, paramilitary, physical barriers and 
isolation) of the prison environment have on cellphone contraband introduction 
activity? 
• In your opinion, is the prison work environment receptive to those who express 
concerns of suspected or confirmed contraband introduction by other officers? 
At the conclusion of the main interview, participants were asked two follow-up questions 
to allow for open expression of any information not covered earlier in the interview 




I transcribed the interviews myself instead of using an outside transcription 
service as identified in the previous chapter.  This was decided due to my concerns of 
misinterpretations of audio, which could impact coding and interpretation.  Instead, I 
decided to use transcription software that was compatible with one of the audio recorders 
used for the interview to transcribe each interview.  Once the software provided a rough 
transcript of each interview, I then listened to each interview and checked each line of the 
document against the recordings for accuracy.  The final transcripts were then used for 
the manual code-recode process to identify the following themes and subthemes present 
within the data. 
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Themes   
Three central themes relevant to the phenomenon of interest emerged as a result 
of coding the data presented in the participant interviews.  These themes—peer dynamics, 
personal characteristics, and organizational climate structure—served to illustrate the 
experiences of the participants relative to cellphone contraband introduction and officer 
violators.  ‘Personal characteristics’ were identified as individualized criteria believed as 
playing some role in the decision-making of those involved in cellphone contraband 
introduction.  A number of specific subthemes were prevalent throughout the participant 
data.  However, these were relatively consistent across the sample.  In looking at the 
subthemes associated with the ‘personal characteristics’ theme, morality, susceptibility to 
manipulation, and thrill seeking were prominent among all three participants.  The ‘peer 
dynamics’ theme was indicative of interpersonal factors among staff that these 
individuals perceived as contributive to officer-related incidents of cellphone contraband 
introduction.  Belongingness and support were two of the most common subthemes 
relative to peer dynamics and cellphone contraband introduction.  Specifically, 
organizational moral and social support as well as social acceptance were recognized as 
having significant impacts on officer decision-making.  Finally, ‘organizational climate 
structure’ highlighted organization-specific antecedents that reinforced the behavior of 
contraband violators.  The associated subthemes—safety, exposure, consistency, and 
transparency—were highlighted as dominant factors in reporting behaviors. 
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Evidence of Trustworthiness 
The participant selection process assisted with maintaining the transferability of 
the data findings.  As previously stated, a total of fourteen participants contacted the 
researcher with the intention of providing data for this study. While all fourteen did not 
end up participating in the data collection process, the heterogeneity of the initial sample 
still has important implications.  Tenure and exposure were the inclusionary criteria for 
this study which was provided at the outset as part of the social media announcement 
used for recruitment. The individuals who contacted the researcher did so with the 
understanding that they would be considered for participation if they have worked at least 
two years as a certified peace officer and have exposure to at least one incident of 
cellphone contraband introduction.  It is significant to note the individuals who later 
declined participation were of various tenures, ranks, ages, and genders while those who 
completed the data collection process were of various ages, rank, and tenure but not 
gender. While these demographics were not significant in participant selection, they may 
have some significance in the data implications.  
In order to ensure the credibility of the analyzed data, the researcher implored 
member-checking to confirm interpretative findings.  The three participants were asked at 
the conclusion of their interviews whether they wanted to participate in this particular 
process at which time only two participants agreed to review the data interpretations for 
accuracy.  Both confirmed that the interpretations ascertained from the interview data 
were in line with their intended statements and neither identified any discrepancies or 
misrepresentations.  The confirmation of interpretation accuracy was also a testament to 
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findings unimpeded by any underlying researcher bias.  As stated in the previous chapter, 
the researcher worked to minimize the imposition of biases by journaling thoughts that 
would impact objectivity in data analysis.  The only relevant bias the researcher was able 
to identify was that those who participated in the interview process would not be open 
and forthcoming regarding this subject matter especially given the difficulty experienced 
in securing those who intended to follow through with the actual interview process.  The 
researcher was also concerned that the information provided would serve to promote the 
participants’ employers or glamorize the organization in order to minimize the risk of 
revealing any negative information.  However, the information obtained from the 
interviewees was in-depth and was perceived by the researcher as authentic because it did 
not serve to glamorize the their employer.  The researcher, having minimal experience 
with the phenomenon of interest, was able to interpret the information provided by the 
participants as it was presented through the interviews without any undue influence.   
Results 
Officer Perceptions of Cellphone Contraband Violators  
According to the data, correctional officers have strong opinions regarding 
individuals who participate in cellphone contraband introduction.  All three participants 
agreed that morality played a significant role in cellphone contraband introduction.  
Participant 1 suggested that strong morals, integrity, and pride in one’s role could help to 
minimize the desire to engage in this form of deviant workplace behavior, which was 
later echoed by the other participants.  Participant 1 stated,  
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I would never in a million years bring an inmate anything. Not a piece of gum, 
contraband, money, because it’s all about integrity…holding true to your sworn 
oath to the state and I think it’s the type of person you are. You’re either going to 
do it or you’re not.   
This was also reflected in the sentiments of the senior ranking member among the 
participants who stated, “I think it comes down to the type of person that is choosing to 
work here…a person is either going to do it or they won’t”.   
Susceptibility to manipulation was noted by all three participants as a significant 
indicator of one’s likeliness to participate in cellphone contraband introduction.  Based 
on their experiences, the consensus among the group was that low self-esteem was 
usually characteristic of the females who engaged in cellphone contraband introduction 
while financial status improvement was common among male violators.  It was 
interesting to note that even though financial incentive was identified as a motivator for 
male participants, only Participant 2 believed poor salary was a deciding factor among 
violators.  Additionally, Participants 1 and 8 suggested thrill-seeking as an underlying 
motive for cellphone contraband activity while Participant 2 suggested 
institutionalization—or the subconscious emulation of inmate behaviors and 
characteristics by officers—as a primary motive.   
All three participants had differing opinions regarding age, education, and rank as 
deterrents for deviant workplace behaviors among fellow officers.  Participant 1 
suggested neither age nor education played any significant role in deterring or 
encouraging cellphone contraband introduction among fellow officers. Participants 2 and 
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8 both agreed that poor education could increase the likeliness that a person would elect 
to engage in this type of behavior.  Participant 8 also suggested that age could be a factor 
in the decision-making associated with cellphone contraband introduction.  According to 
this participant, 
[T]hey recruit young people from the local high schools… a lot of times they 
don’t know any better and haven’t had any real job exposure and they don’t 
recognize the impact that something like that can have on them in the future.   
In discussing the relationship between rank and cellphone contraband violators, 
participants 1 and 8 had differing but noteworthy opinions.  According to participant 1, 
contraband introduction is not uncommon among senior ranking staff (such as 
lieutenants, captains, and wardens) which is suggestive of rank serving no significant role 
in deterrence.  As an indication of her recognition of the fact that the behavior that is 
modeled by supervisory staff is the behavior that will most likely be emulated by lower 
ranked staff Participant 8 stated, “I try to be as ethical as possible and I try to display that 
to my staff.”  
In reporting their perceptions of cellphone violators, all three participants were 
unanimous in their beliefs that the behavior changes their view of the individual as 
opposed to the organization.  Participants 1 and 2 intimated that they would no longer 
trust an officer who was suspected of introducing contraband into their workplace.  Both 
participants felt that this behavior was not only a violation of trust between co-workers 
but it was also a violation of public trust.  As a the only participating supervisor, 
participant 8 presented a unique perspective regarding contraband violators as she 
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reported feeling a sense of disappointment in staff identified as introducing contraband.  
According to this participant, “I feel like it’s a reflection of me (leadership) because 
maybe they did it because they felt like they couldn’t reach out to any of us for help.”   
Climate and Cellphone Contraband Introduction   
While perceptions of individual violators are most effected by incidents of 
contraband deviance, the participants were also able to conceptualize ways in which the 
organizational climate inadvertently reinforces this behavior.  The participants agreed 
that while cellphone contraband introduction is not condoned, it is generally an 
anticipated occurrence among staff members.  The participants suggested that this 
expectation creates a certain degree of cynicism among staff, particularly security staff, 
because, as one participant explained, “[I]t’s almost like a waiting game to see who it’s 
going to be.”  
The participants explained that cellphone contraband introduction is an issue that 
is discussed ad nauseum during one’s tenure as a correctional officer beginning with 
basic correctional officer training (BCOT) and continuing with annual mandatory 
trainings.  It is also heavily discussed among staff when incidents occur primarily in an 
unofficial, fact-seeking capacity.  All three participants conceded an unspoken separation 
between security staff and civilian staff and indicated that contraband violations by 
civilian staff often involved illegal substances (including narcotics and cigarettes) and 
sexual interactions.  According to the participants, these incidents are not internalized to 
the same extent as violations by fellow officers.  Participant 1 suggested that cellphone 
contraband introduction was more common among security staff because of the constant 
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proximity to inmates and the lack of consistent scrutiny of security personnel upon 
entrance.  This same participant also opined that this same inconsistency often aids higher 
ranking individuals with contraband introduction which is why, in her opinion, rank plays 
an insignificant role in deterrence.  Participant 2 stated that when made aware of 
incidents of contraband introduction she expects the violator to be civilian personnel as 
opposed to security staff while participant 8 stated that the social distance between the 
two staff groups allows her to easily disconnect from these incidents when they involve 
civilian staff.   
Additionally, participants surmised poor morale and lack of support as 
instrumental organizational elements in contraband introduction among security staff.  
Participants concurred that the climate within their individual work environments 
generally lacked in support from peers, superiors, and administration.  Participants 2 and 
8 attested to the necessity of organizational support when faced with understaffing, long 
shifts, and the underlying dangers within correctional facilities.  Participant 1 explained 
that within-group moral and social support are critical among officers because of the 
inherent stress associated with the work environment.  She disclosed that based on her 
interactions with non-correctional staff via social media, the community perception is that 
all correctional officers participate in some form of contraband introduction.  According 
to her, this misconception forces correctional officers to seek out support among their 
fellow officers and that support could be either positive or negative depending on the 
group.  Additionally, this participant theorized that social acceptance among officers—
particularly young officers—often dictates behaviors within the workplace, a theory 
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supported by Participant 8.  Because of the reported insufficiency regarding 
intraorganizational support, familial support and external social support were suggested 
as protective factors in deterring contraband introduction among officers even though 
neither participant believed the problem would ever fully end.  In line with this, 
Participant 1 asserted that justifications or minimizations of unethical or illegal behavior 
within one’s social support could affect the decision-making process of an officer with 
Participant 8 reinforcing this position stating, “it (contraband introduction) isn’t that 
uncommon which means the individuals start to normalize it which makes participation 
that much easier to rationalize.”   
Climate and Reporting Behaviors 
Safety, exposure, consistency, and transparency were implicated as salient 
concepts in the discussion of reporting behaviors in corrections.  When questioned about 
administrative receptiveness and officer comfort in reporting suspected contraband 
introduction, the participants’ responses differed in some areas. The participants were 
unanimous in identifying concerns for safety as the primary cause for reporting other 
officers suspected of contraband introduction.  Participant 1’s stated rationale for 
reporting was “we are a brotherhood, yes, but…I’m protecting myself first and 
foremost.”  Similarly, Participant 2 state, “I start to fear for my safety… anyone who is 
compromised in that manner can’t be trusted. I don’t feel comfortable working around 
them anymore.” Participant 8 described a similar sentiment in that by not participating in 
this type of behavior, she has not compromised the safety of her staff as a supervisor.  
Yet while the participants credited the organization with attempting to proactively 
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discourage staff participation in contraband introduction through routine trainings, they 
also credited consistent exposure to the problem as an inadvertent reinforcement for 
some.  Participants 1 and 8 suggested consistent exposure combined with inconsistent 
repercussive actions bolster an individual’s ability to justify participation in cellphone 
contraband introduction.  According to these participants, staff are made aware of these 
incidents and often find out later that accused parties do not consistently face the 
repercussions outlined in policies and trainings.  Participants 1 and 8 also explained that 
punishment discretion is often left to individual facilities and decisions regarding 
termination and resignation in lieu of termination determined by facility administration 
while cases that involve arrest and prosecution are based on the discretion of the district 
attorney.  These same participants concurred that when officer violators face significant 
consequences, specifically arrest and prosecution, other officers understand and 
appreciate the gravity of the situation.  According to Participant 8, “[I]f they thought the 
punishment would be severe enough, they would probably not want to do it.”  When less 
severe consequences were imposed officers, the participants reported feeling a sense of 
disappointment and silent complacency on behalf of the department.   
Additionally, these participants suggested a lack of transparency by the 
department—as evidenced through community relations and also through 
intraorganizational relations—as having a significant role in participation as well as 
reporting behaviors. Participant 1 was the only participant who identified administrators 
as being receptive to officers reporting contraband violators.  However, this participant 
also agreed with Participants 2 and 8 in noting that reporting incidents of suspected 
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contraband introduction seemingly goes unanswered.  At least two participants reported 
that it was not uncommon for contraband violation incidents to be handled “quietly” so as 
to not bring unwanted attention to the department.  The participants posited that this lack 
of transparency was prevalent within the organizational climate.  Participant 2 believed 
the organization’s lack of transparency was a result of reputation preservation and 
community relations.  
I think the agency’s lack of real acknowledgement of the problem leaves it 
unaddressed and allows it to continue to run rampant and I think people know it.  
The agency doesn’t want the public to know that there are some people who are 
supposed to manage these people who actually get caught up in bringing in 
contraband. 
Participant 8 opined:  
I still feel like the department is trying to brush it under the rug but it further 
reinforces the notion that they—as a department—are not taking as active of a 
role in confronting the problem head on…The agency underreports the numbers 
because they don’t want the department to seem more corrupt in public opinion 
than it really is. 
Participant 1, on the other hand, attributed transparency issues with investigation 
preservation by stating, “I think they are receptive but a lot of times they may act like 
they’re not because they have certain things in the work or they got somebody being 
investigated.”  According to the participants, the lack of transparency also deterred 
reporting because officers feel as though their concerns are not being taken seriously or 
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are being ignored.  Additionally, the participants reported an awareness of at least one 
incident of a fellow officer reporting their suspicions and subsequently receiving negative 
treatment by peers and superiors.  Participants 1 and 2 indicated that situations that 
resulted in peer ostracization diminished within-group trust.  This lack of transparency is 
concerning for officers because it not only undermines the strict and rigid façade of the 
paramilitary prison-system but it also negatively-impacts the morale of those who work 
within the organization 
Summary 
The data recruitment, collection, and analysis processes associated with this study 
followed most procedures as described in the previous chapter in order to answer the 
foundational research questions.  According to the data reported in this study, the 
perpetration of unethical and illegal acts by rogue officers were attributed solely to the 
individual and not the environment in which they work.  Deviant acts committed by 
fellow officers were not viewed as a derivative of the work environment and instead were 
considered moral deficits on the part of the actor.  Contraband introduction was identified 
as a persistent, yet predictable threat and cellphone contraband introduction was indicated 
as an evolution of this unending problem.  However, there were mixed perceptions in 
regard to reporting behaviors while the officers who declined participation provided 
support for the consideration of possible peer and administrative discouragement.  The 
results of this chapter are explored further in the final chapter of this study.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The central purpose of this study was to gain perceptual insight into the lived 
experiences of correctional officers who, at some point during their careers, have 
experienced cellphone contraband introduction by fellow officers.  The findings of this 
study indicate that officers are likely to have a negative view of the individual violator.  
Additionally, some officers may feel as though the organizational climate does little to 
deter the behaviors of rogue officers.  As a result of this climate, officers may also 
experience some hesitation in reporting suspected contraband introduction by fellow 
officers.   
Interpretation of the Findings 
Ethical climate theory served as the theoretical foundation for this study in order 
to assist in the exploration of institutional factors and social dynamics within the 
correctional environment that could potentially reinforce contraband introduction among 
officers.  Ethical climate theory establishes the existence of unspoken guidelines within 
an organization that dictate whether employee behaviors are viewed as acceptable or 
unacceptable based on an underlying system of rewards and punishment.  Employee 
behaviors within the organization could be considered unethical or immoral to those 
outside the organization but could also be viewed as justifiable within the organization 
depending on the norms that exist within the organizational climate.  According to ethical 
climate theory, the correctional climate is one that most aligns with both law and code 
and rules climates.  Law and code climate sets the expectation that employees will adhere 
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to legal and professional standards, whereas rules climate requires employees to follow 
all company rules and procedures (Victor & Cullen, 1998).  Although this may be the 
image the department hopes to portray to outsiders, the experiences described by the 
participants suggests a disconnect between perception and reality.  Prior to the 
commencement of this study, the available data provided little insight into the differences 
of perceived versus actual organizational climate through the lens of those who work in 
these environments.  Based on the data provided, correctional officers could perceive the 
organizational climate as having some role in contraband introduction behaviors and the 
reporting of these behaviors to administration.  
Within the context of this theory, the data confirm the existence of some form of 
ethical dissonance within the correctional environment.  When discussing their individual 
experiences with incidents of officer-involved contraband introduction, the consensus 
among the participants was that the perception of the participating officer is irrevocably 
altered.  Although the participants did not explicitly state a change in perceptions of their 
work environments, the data support a less than favorable view of the organization in 
regard to this specific topic as evidenced by their reporting of a general disappointment 
with the organization’s lack of prevention efforts.  The data also indicate that 
accountability avoidance and responsibility evasion may be reinforced by the 
organizational climate due to inconsistencies in punishment and reprimand.  Additionally, 
noncomplicit officers are less likely to feel empowered to report their suspicions of 
possible violators due to perceived lack of administrative interest and potential retaliation 
for expressing concern for this behavior.  In other words, noncomplicit officers believe 
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potential violators are less likely to be deterred by established consequences because 
those consequences are not consistently reinforced during known incidents of contraband 
introduction.   
 The findings of this study also reiterate contributory factors of contraband 
introduction as previously highlighted in the existing literature.  The relevant literature 
suggests the existence of factors within the correctional work setting that are instrumental 
to the cellphone contraband market (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; York, 2016; CAPI, 2016; 
Farnese et al., 2016).  These factors include individual characteristics, peer dynamics, and 
intraorganizational dynamics—similar to those identified within this study—that 
influence employee decision-making regarding deviant behaviors as correctional 
employees.  Within the context of the available literature, this study confirms the roles of 
morality, social support, and belongingness in this decision-making process.  Financial 
incentives and self-esteem were also confirmed as contributing agents to engagement in 
contraband activity; however, these factors were identified as secondary extensions of the 
others.  The findings also reinforce correctional employees’ valuation of support by not 
only those outside of the workplace but also within the immediate work environment, 
particularly administrative support.  Previous researchers have emphasized correctional 
employees’ inability to identify sufficient support within their work environment as 
negatively impacting their views of their workplace and subsequent interactions with 
peers and superiors (Worley, 2016; Worley & Worley, 2011, 2013).  Further, this lack of 
organizational support was also implicated as a potential catalyst for unethical behaviors 
within the workplace.  In this regard, the current study confirms the findings of previous 
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studies while also suggesting that employees may experience difficulty in identifying 
sources of support within their organization which increases officers’ apathy and 
indifference towards deviancy issues such as cellphone contraband introduction.  
Additionally, this study extends the current body of literature by providing additional 
insight into officers’ views of contraband activity as potentially unavoidable within the 
correctional work environment.  
Limitations of the Study 
I anticipated limitations related to generalizability, time-limited data collection, 
and the impact of the correctional officer code on sampling size.  The data collected are 
reflective of individuals who have experienced cellphone contraband introduction while 
employed as correctional officers.  All participants—including those who did not 
participate in the data collection phase—were from the same geographical area and were 
of various experience levels and tenures.  Given that the three individuals who 
participated in the data collection process were from the same geographical location, the 
geographic limitation is one that remains relevant in this study.   
The data collection process was conducted once but with individuals who had 
different tenures and rank.  The main concern with a time-limited study is that it is not 
reflective of an experience over the course of time and provides a single snapshot of the 
phenomenon at a specific period of time.  However, the significance of the tenure points 
and rank differences allows for insight into this phenomenon at different points of the 
career trajectory.  Because two individuals were of the same rank but at different points 
in their careers (early career and approaching retirement), their experiences regarding the 
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same phenomenon have different implications relative to their work history in 
corrections.  The tenure of the participant with the highest rank was one year shorter than 
that of the longest-tenured participant; however, their perceptions regarding certain 
aspects of the phenomenon were also in slight contrast.  Therefore, differences and 
similarities indicated by these participants may have some application to others who hold 
similar ranks and tenures.  Experiences of those who fall midway between these career 
points as well as those of higher rank were unaccounted for in this study, which offers 
opportunity for exploration. 
It is important to note that the final sampling size was smaller than anticipated.  In 
keeping with the research plan, voluntary participants contacted me to express interest in 
providing data for the study.  The identified range of eight to 10 participants was initially 
met and included scheduled interviews for all except one participant.  At some point, the 
majority of these individuals expressed no interest in further participation in the study.  
As the participants began to withdraw from the study, three additional participants 
expressed interest in the study bringing the total of volunteers to 14.  However, these two 
participants also declined further participation by avoiding additional contact.  Only one 
of the participants who completed data collection offered to share my contact information 
with other prospective participants; however, no additional volunteers were identified.  
By exhausting the sampling procedures identified in Chapter 3, I was confident in 
proceeding with the remaining steps of the study.   
Although the data provided were sufficient for extrapolating relevant findings, 
sample size is important when determining saturation in any qualitative study.  The data 
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and findings relative to the predetermined research questions were consistent throughout 
with few identifiable discrepancies noted within subareas—such as the influence of 
education on one’s willingness to participate in cellphone contraband introduction.  Also, 
the interview participants were homogenous in gender but not rank, age, or length of 
tenure, which provides additional credibility to response consistency among them.  As 
such, saturation can be confirmed to a certain extent; however, additional data collected 
as an extension of this study could help provide additional confirmation.   
In addition, the correctional officer code could be implicated as a limitation in 
sampling.  Similar to the code of silence among other law enforcement officers, the 
correctional officer code discourages the sharing of information that would be harmful to 
the reputation of other officers or the organization for which they work.  Initially, those 
interested in participation in the study voluntarily contacted me and provided relevant 
demographic information in anticipation of completing the data collection process.  
Following the completion of interviews with the first two participants, I began to 
experience challenges with participants following through with the data collection 
process.  With the exception of the eighth participant, who participated in interviewing, 
and the two participants who experienced legal concerns during the course of the 
recruitment process, the remaining nine participants were most likely reluctant to 
participate due to the unspoken code of silence.  At least three of the participants openly 
spoke of retaliation concerns during post-scheduling cancellations.  Although the others 
did not overtly express the same concerns, it can be inferred that these individuals likely 
became wary of answering questions that involved other officers for one reason or 
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another.  Given the timing of the cancellations—after interview times were scheduled—
one could speculate that these officers had spoken with other officers or supervisors and 
were either directly or indirectly discouraged from ongoing participation in the study.  
One individual stated that her supervisor told her that she would need permission to 
participate in the study, which was a factually inaccurate statement given that she was 
informed by me that she would be interviewed as a private citizen and not as a 
representative of her organization.  However, in working in an environment that 
discourages open participation with outsiders, once the seed of doubt was planted it was 
unlikely that she could be convinced that her participation would not subject her to any 
official reprimand or punitive actions from her employer.  The others most likely 
received similar misinformation from within their work environment and were deterred 
from continued participation as a result.  Therefore, it is probable that those who 
subsequently declined participation in interviewing without any formal explanation were 
impacted by this informal code of conduct. 
Additionally, the time-lapse between recruitment and data collection may have 
provided the officers with time to reconsider their involvement and the possible 
implications associated with participating in this type of research.  Even though the 
purpose of the research was detailed for the participants, it would not be surprising if, 
over time, these individuals assumed an underlying motive or agenda associated with 
studying this particular phenomenon.  This is especially likely to be true if I was viewed 
as an outsider or non-law enforcement because blind loyalty is a central tenet within 
many, if not all, law enforcement agencies, even if it comes at the detriment of others.  If 
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participants believed I was attempting to “trap” or “trick” them into sharing information 
that could be used against them later on or that the information would be shared with 
outside law enforcement, this could have increased their angst and hesitation in moving 
forward with data collection efforts.  Based on historical references and examples, 
officers in any area of law enforcement are often reluctant to report on other rogue 
officers’ behaviors even with the protection of anonymity and confidentiality (York, 
2016; Dennehy & Nantel, 2006; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007).  The recourse for reporting 
officer offenses is often worse for the witnesses and creates an intolerable work life 
(Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007).  Even with my disassociation with the department of 
corrections, officers remained reluctant to fully cooperate throughout the entire process of 
the study.  Coordinating efforts with the organization most likely would not have changed 
this and, instead, probably would have encouraged participant deception in order to deter 
negative administrative repercussions.  It also would have allowed the department an 
opportunity to encourage favorable reporting by officers which would disproportionately 
impact the accuracy of the data.  In understanding this reality, it was unlikely that any 
changes to the process of this study would have significantly improved participation. 
Recommendations 
The completion of this study yielded a number of significant recommendations 
for future research.  Due to the sensitive nature of this particular topic, future studies 
should consider conducting written interviews with participants.  This may help minimize 
some reluctance on behalf of participants who may be more willing to engage in data 
collection through a less personal method.  Also, consideration for participants who are 
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no longer employed in corrections may also be useful in securing participants for data 
collection.  Individuals who are no longer employed with the agency may be less likely to 
experience hesitation relative to retaliation concerns if there is some distance between 
them and their former employer.  Additionally, expanding the target population to include 
multiple states or regions might improve participation.  While this might also present 
other limitations not represented in this study, it could also improve generalizability 
concerns as well as increase the breadth of relevant data.  It would not be unwise to 
consider working in conjunction with an interested agency; however, this would still 
create concerns regarding participant authenticity.  Future studies might also explore the 
role of the correctional climate in discrepancies in deviance (i.e., male violators versus 
female violators, civilian staff violators versus security staff violators) or whether 
adherence to organizational climate in corrections is susceptible to certain demographics.  
Exploration of this phenomenon can also extend into other areas of consideration such as 
jails versus prisons, state versus federal facilities, and variations in offender custody 
level.  Distinctions such as these are significant within correctional environments as they 
often contribute to noticeable variations within each independent climate.   
Implications 
Corrections organizations around the world continue to lose the war with 
cellphone contraband.  Correctional administrators often blame the introduction of 
contraband on external forces and view it as a problem in need of external regulation, 
hence the development of tougher laws and regulatory policies to address this issue.  This 
study, however, demonstrates that the unwillingness of these administrators to reflect on 
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internal contributors will continue to diminish their ability eradicate this problem.  Rather 
than seeking out external contributors, this study indicates the need for reform of internal 
practices in order to recalibrate the climate so that policy and practice are in alignment.  
Policies are only as good as the agencies who reinforce them and based on the data 
provided in this study, policy reinforcement is a central issue in contraband introduction 
according to the people who are directly impacted by it.  Correctional departments across 
the country have some form of policy that directly deals with contraband introduction; 
however, it is unlikely that poor reinforcement is characteristic of only one or two of 
these departments.  And with an increase in public attention focused on criminal justice 
reform, some community shareholders believe cellphones in correctional environments 
aid in increased transparency as well as insight into conditions and treatment of 
individuals within these institutions.  As a result, there are some who believe cellphones 
in prison serve some beneficent purpose and should not be completely restricted.  This 
line of thought further substantiates the need for correctional researchers to expand the 
body of knowledge centered around the dangers of cellphone contraband introduction 
within correctional facilities.  Similarly, it is imperative that departments work to ensure 
their policies are guided by this research and are fully reinforced without exception 
because inconsistencies in punishment detract from the significance of the behavior as 
well as the virtue of the organization.  Additionally, this study further supports the basic 
tenants of ethical climate theory by adding to the available body of climate literature 
within correctional organizations.  Conducting correctional research from a climate-based 
theoretical foundation allows for the application of this theoretical foundation in the 
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exploration of other areas within correctional research.  Similarly, climate-based 
correctional research also provides for deeper exploration into other forms of correctional 
deviance that may not have been explored with consideration for the role of 
organizational norms. 
Conclusion 
Corrections officers are viewed as gatekeepers and protectors by the community, 
sheltering law-abiding citizens from those who violate societal norms.  This image 
becomes tarnished each time an officer is exposed for introducing contraband into an 
institution.  Before this behavior becomes the norm rather than the exception, it is 
imperative that measures are taken to decrease the occurrence.  By exploring the 
perceptions of those who have been impacted by contraband introduction, this study 
expounds upon the existing body of literature to provide greater depth and clarity for 
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